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INTRODUCTION
Several federal statutes criminalize conduct by foreigners that has no
relation to the United States. Some of these measures purportedly exercise
Congress’s power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”1 This raises a
serious and previously unexplored question about the meaning and jurisdictional breadth of the Define and Punish Clause: Does the clause authorize
Congress to legislate for the rest of the world?
This question intersects with several pressing controversies. As European nations have increasingly begun to exercise universal jurisdiction over
various crimes, there is pressure on the United States to follow suit.2 Aliens
have increasingly turned to U.S. courts to adjudicate purely foreign disputes.3 Also, the interplay between international law and constitutional law
has become a much debated issue.4 A better understanding of the Define
and Punish Clause will illuminate each of these controversies:5 in one

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“Clause Ten” or the “Define and Punish Clause”). When speaking
of particular parts of the clause, this Article will refer to the high seas power as the “Piracies and Felonies” provision and to the law of nations power as the “Offenses” provision.
2
See, e.g., FIONA MCKAY, REDRESS TRUST, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, TORTURE AND
GENOCIDE (1999), available at http://www.redress.org/publication/UJEurope.pdf; LUC REYDAMS,
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES (2003); David B. Rivkin, Jr.
& Lee A. Casey, Op-Ed., Europe’s Runaway Prosecutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at A19 (discussing the use of universal jurisdiction by European nations in attempting to prosecute American officials for alleged violations of international law).
3
See, e.g., Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (involving suit by Lebanese citizens
against Israeli defense officials concerning military actions in southern Lebanon); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (involving suit by South African nationals against U.S. and
foreign corporations for abetting apartheid); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing suit by Paraguayan nationals against former Paragyuan military officials for torture committed during that country’s civil war); see also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:
What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004).
4
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43
(2004); Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind”: International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 261 (2005); John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2006).
5
United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Piracies and Felonies
power is “the only specific grant of power to be found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses
outside the territorial limits of the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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breath the clause addresses universal jurisdiction (piracies), extraterritorial
crimes (felonies on the high seas), and violations of international law.
This Article demonstrates that the Define and Punish Clause limits
Congress’s power to criminalize conduct that lacks a U.S. nexus. Two possible interpretations emerge from examining the evidence. At most, Congress can legislate universally only when international law has made
punishment of the regulated conduct universally cognizable. In the narrowest interpretation, Congress’s universal jurisdiction powers under the clause
are restricted solely to piracy. In either case, the restriction comes not from
the independent force of international law but from the Constitution itself,
which incorporates international law by reference in Clause Ten. This conclusion suggests that at least one important criminal law currently in force
and several others pending in Congress exceed Congress’s Article I competence. Moreover, it has cautionary implications for Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) cases against foreign officials for abuses committed against their
own nationals.
Understanding the limits on universal jurisdiction under the Define and
Punish Clause requires exploring its particularly obscure “Piracies and
Felonies” provision.6 This inquiry also has important ramifications for the
scope of the more often used “Offenses” power. Because maritime matters
were so central to the life of the early Republic, almost all discussions of
universal jurisdiction from the Founding Era until the twentieth century involved matters on the “high seas,” and thus primarily implicate those powers. The Piracies and Felonies provision has direct modern relevance:
Congress has relied on it to enact America’s most used criminal universal
jurisdiction statute, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).7
No scholarship has examined the meaning of the Piracies and Felonies
provision.8 (It is wonderful that this can still be said of any constitutional
provision.) Clause Ten’s other element, the power to “define and punish
. . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” has been recently described as
6

See United States v. Biermann, 678 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (“The courts of the
United States have not had many occasions to interpret this constitutional provision.”); HERITAGE
FOUND., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 126 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (describing the clause’s meaning as “not . . . controversial”); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S.
Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 337 (“[T]he scope of the Define and Punish Clause is unclear . . . .”).
7
See United States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 Fed. App’x 832, 835–36 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
contention that the Piracies and Felonies power does not authorize universal jurisdiction over drug offenses).
8
Professor Crosskey discusses the provision in some detail, but from a separation of powers perspective. See 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 443–58 (1953). He sees the provision as giving Congress authority that, in British
law, because of its connection to the admiralty, would have resided with the executive. Id. at 445–46;
see also A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 419–22 (1997) (reading United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 186
(1820), to mean that Congress lacks constitutional authority to punish purely foreign conduct not subject
to universal jurisdiction under international law). The Furlong case is discussed infra Part IV.C.3.
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the least “understood”9 and most “understudied”10 constitutional provision.11
Surely its even more neglected sibling, the Piracies and Felonies provision,
demands analysis.
The inquiry begins with the text itself, which contains no explicit jurisdictional limits. However, Clause Ten’s doubly redundant structure has
important implications for the permissibility of universal jurisdiction when
considered against the legal background of 1789. Piracy was both a “Felon[y]” and an “Offense[] against the Law of Nations.” Yet the powers are
mentioned separately, drawing attention to the one feature that distinguished piracy from all other felonies and offenses. Piracy was the only
universal jurisdiction crime.12 By separating out the jurisdictionally unique
offense, the text suggests a separate jurisdictional treatment for it. When
dealing with piracy, Congress can use the uniquely broad jurisdictional
scope associated with that offense. However, this jurisdiction does not extend to the other high seas felonies and international law crimes punishable
under Clause Ten. If Congress could apply universal jurisdiction to regular
high seas felonies, it would obliterate the only legal distinction between piracies and felonies.
Going beyond the text, this Article brings together a wide variety of
sources—judicial, political, and legislative—bearing on the jurisdictional
scope of Clause Ten.13 This Article considers the views of the Framers and
other important interpreters from the early Republic in all three branches of
government.
The view that the Congress cannot use Clause Ten as a basis for universal jurisdiction over any crime except piracy had support from such leading jurists as James Wilson (a drafter of the Constitution), John Marshall,
and Joseph Story. Their discussions of the clause arose in the context of
major historical dramas—the extradition of a mutineer to the British in
1799, which nearly lead to the congressional censure of President Adams;
the revolt of Spain’s South American colonies in the 1810s, which lead to a
9

J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the
Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 847 (2007).
10
Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretation of Customary International Law,
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 860 (2005).
11
The clause has in recent years attracted attention, particularly for its role in granting extraterritorial powers to Congress. See Kent, supra note 9, at 848, 848 n.19 (citing an earlier work and noting a
“lack of in-depth scholarship about the Clause”); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 453–54 (2000); Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad: Constitutional
Limits on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305, 1305 (1999).
12
See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 190–205 (2004) (discussing piracy’s status as the prototypical universal
jurisdiction crime).
13
Cf. Bradley, supra note 6, at 335 (“Although the founders may not have envisioned that this
power would be used to regulate conduct on foreign soil, I am not aware of any evidence showing that
they meant to disallow such power if and when international law evolved to allow for its exercise.”).
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period of maritime lawlessness; and the broad Anglo-American campaign
to abolish the slave trade. By 1820, both Congress and the Supreme Court
had rejected universal jurisdiction over anything but “piracies.” When the
question arose again in recent decades, legislators and jurists simply neglected to ask whether the Define and Punish power had jurisdictional limits.14
*

*

*

The Article’s conclusions have implications for many of the nation’s
universal jurisdiction laws. The sole source of universal jurisdiction used
by the United States today is the MDLEA.15 This statute extends U.S. narcotics laws to foreigners found with contraband on foreign vessels anywhere in the world, regardless of their destination. Aside from the
MDLEA, U.S. law allows for universal jurisdiction in a few other situations.16 It proscribes giving “material support” to terrorist groups17 even
when neither the support nor the group itself has any connection to America.18 The material support law was recently enlarged to apply U.S. narcotics laws universally to any drug trafficking anywhere, if its proceeds
support terrorism.19 Furthermore, Congress recently extended universal jurisdiction to the use or recruitment of child soldiers, and recent legislative

14

One can only speculate about the reasons for the oversight. The greatly expanded scope of Congress’s power since the 1930s may make one forget that it still needs an Article I basis. In addition, the
growing acceptance of universal jurisdiction in international law may have distracted attention from
whether the Constitution authorizes it. Finally, the great decline in the admiralty docket might have led
people to miss what would have previously been more obviously suggested by the juxtaposition of “Piracies” and “Felonies.”
15
46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70501–07 (West 2008); see also 46 U.S.C.A. § 70502(c)(1)(A), (C) (West 2008)
(establishing jurisdiction over vessels “without nationality” and vessels “registered in a foreign nation
where the flag nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the
United States”).
16
Piracy, the original universal jurisdiction offense, remains universally cognizable under current
states. See 18 USC § 1651 (2006).
17
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).
18
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1)(C) (2006).
19
See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, § 122,
120 Stat. 192, 224 (2006) (amending the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 951–71 (2000)). Jurisdiction is satisfied simply if the offender subsequently comes or “is brought” to
the United States. Id.; see also Conference Report on H.R. 3199, USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 151 CONG. REC. H11515, H11538–39 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Hyde) (“Our hardworking Drug Enforcement Administration will no longer be challenged to produce evidence of a nexus of these illicit drugs to the United States.”).
The material support law already criminalizes any financial aid to terror groups. The new provision,
in effect, allows for an additional and greater sentence when the support comes through conduct that
would violate U.S. drug law if there was an American nexus.
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efforts have tried to do the same with human trafficking.20 Congress has authorized universal jurisdiction for hijacking, hostage-taking, and torture,
which have been designated universal jurisdiction offenses by multilateral
conventions.21 These laws have only been used in a few cases, and perhaps
never as the basis for a purely universal jurisdiction prosecution.22 Other
statutes give universal scope to civil liability23 for certain violations of international law24 and U.S. boycott regulations.25
*

*

*

This Article focuses on limitations on universal jurisdiction inherent in
the Define and Punish Clause. It does not consider other constitutional objections to universal criminal legislation, nor does it deal with other potential justifications. Assertions of universal jurisdiction, and extraterritorial
jurisdiction more generally, have been challenged, with little success, for
20

See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (West 2008); see also
Trafficking in Persons Accountability Act of 2007, S. 1703, 110th Cong. (2007).
21
Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 46502(b) (2000) (implementing the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft); Destruction of Aircraft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2006);
Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1)(B) (2006) (extending jurisdiction solely on the basis of
subsequent U.S. presence of suspect, pursuant to the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (Dec. 17, 1979)); see
18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006) (criminalizing torture anywhere in the world); United States v. Rezaq,
134 F.3d 1121, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that Congress specifically intended to create universal
jurisdiction over hijacking); see also Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, S. 888, 110th Cong. (2007).
22
One might think United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2008), which explicitly invokes
universal jurisdiction over piracy, is an exception to U.S. shyness in universal jurisdiction matters. Yet
the case—involving the murder of a foreign national by a Chinese sailor on a Taiwanese-owned, Seychelles-flagged fishing vessel in the middle of the Pacific Ocean—was not truly one of piracy, or universal jurisdiction. Under international law, offenses committed by crewmembers aboard their own
vessel do not amount to piracy. While the court was mistaken in treating it as a piracy case, it did have
subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of a treaty and implementing legislation. See Eugene Kontorovich,
International Decisions: United States v. Shi, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming Apr. 2009).
23
Some argue that the Define and Punish Clause may not authorize anything but criminal measures,
in which case the analysis here would not apply to the noncriminal statutes. See, e.g., HERITAGE
FOUND., supra note 6, at 127. But see Stephens, supra note 11, at 483–519 (arguing that “Offenses”
also includes civil wrongs).
24
See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L.
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (providing liability for “any person” acting under authority from a “foreign
nation”). While the latter explicitly contemplates universal jurisdiction, the scope of universal jurisdiction under the former remains unclear. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–63 (2004)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Kontorovich, supra note 3.
25
Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, the President can impose civil sanctions on foreigners
who invest in or provide certain goods to the eponymous countries. See J. Brett Busby, Note, Jurisdiction to Limit Third-Country Interaction with Sanctioned States: The Iran and Libya Sanctions and
Helms-Burton Acts, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 621, 647 (1998) (“[T]he Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
does not require the proof of any U.S.-related conduct whatsoever before its sanctions may be imposed.”). To the extent such trade may be maritime, the Act might implicate the Define and Punish
Clause.
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violating due process rights.26 The argument is that the Fifth Amendment
requires the defendant’s conduct to have some nexus with the United States,
This presumes that Congress has the Article I authority to criminalize
purely foreign conduct in the first place. While this Article demonstrates
the existence of a nexus limitation on extraterritorial prosecution, its source
is not due process, but rather the Define and Punish power. The exact
source of a nexus requirement is important. With Article I limitations,
unlike the personal rights implicated by due process, the consent of the defendant or foreign state is irrelevant. Foreign nations cannot bestow additional legislative powers on Congress.
The exception to this rule is legislation pursuant to treaties. Mainstream interpretations of the treaty power authorize Congress to implement
treaties through domestic legislation that would not otherwise be within its
enumerated powers.27 Thus, the Offenses power refers to customary rather
than conventional international law because when a treaty is in the picture,
it defines the relevant scope of Congress’s power. Most universal jurisdiction laws were passed to implement particular treaties.28 However, there is
no obvious treaty basis for the MDLEA, the ATS, or the child soldier law.
This Article does not explore treaty power or other possible constitutional
bases for universal jurisdiction laws, which should be examined on a statute-by-statute basis.29
*

*

*

Part I of this Article deals with some issues of interpretive method. It
explains that while for circumstantial reasons the Article relies heavily on
evidence from the Founding generation, it does not require a commitment
to originalism. It also discusses whether constitutional provisions that refer
to international law—such as Clause Ten—incorporate the law as it was in
1789 or as it is today. Parts II and III examine the origins and purposes of
the Define and Punish Clause by looking to its emergence in the Articles of
26

See, e.g., United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1107–10 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that provisions of the MDLEA requiring courts to decide whether statutory jurisdictional requirements have been
met do not violate the Due Process Clause or the right to a jury trial).
27
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding migratory bird regulations that
may not have been within Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it was passed to implement
treaty obligations with Britain).
28
See supra note 21. However, these statutes arguably go further than the treaties on which they
are based. The conventions only purport to create “universal” jurisdictional rights over nationals of signatory states. While most nations have joined these treaties, the implementing statutes do not limit their
application to the nationals of signatory states.
29
Unlike the Torture Victim Protection Act, passed pursuant to Torture Convention, the ATS by its
terms encompasses both customary and conventional international law, and thus it is hard to see it as
“necessary and proper” to any particular treaty. The companion piece to this Article discusses a range of
alternate bases for the MDLEA, including treaty powers and the Foreign Commerce Clause, but ultimately finds them inadequate. See Kontorovich, supra note †.
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Confederation, the reasons behind its adoption in Philadelphia, the strange
redundancy in its terms, and how it should be understood given the background legal norms of the time. Parts IV and V look at the two major episodes in which the constitutional question has been confronted. Part IV
examines the hostile judicial response to a law passed by the First Congress
that, if read literally, would have made a wide variety of maritime crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction. Part V recounts how Congress, when it
sought to establish slave trading as a universal jurisdiction offense, ultimately concluded that it lacked the constitutional authority to do so. Finally, the conclusion assembles the pieces of evidence to formulate a
general statement of the jurisdictional limits under Clause Ten, taking into
account the major expansion of universal jurisdiction in recent decades.
I.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

A. Interpretive Theories
This Article focuses heavily on the views of the Framers and their immediate successors in the early Republic. This should not be mistaken as a
commitment to any brand of originalism. All major interpretive approaches
place great weight on the views of the Constitution’s authors, adopters, and
early interpreters.30 Furthermore, the use of such evidence is unavoidable,
as almost all discussion of Clause Ten’s scope took place in the Republic’s
first thirty years.
This Article’s only axiom is that Congress’s powers are finite and
enumerated.31 Beyond that, the Article does not rely on any particular theory of constitutional interpretation. It promiscuously considers the background and drafting history of the clause, the meaning of the text given the
legal vocabulary of the time, the understanding of the founding generation,
the subsequent application of the clause by Congress and the courts in situations not necessarily contemplated by the Framers, and the more general
purposes it was designed to serve.32 Recourse to particular theories of interpretation is unnecessary when, as here, the evidence from a variety of
sources points predominantly in one direction.

30

See Kent, supra note 9, at 858–60 (describing consensus among interpretive methods on the importance of the Constitution’s original meaning).
31
See generally Bradley, supra note 6, at 334–35 (taking these principles as axiomatic).
32
This Article disclaims a strong version of original intent. It does not contend that the delegates at
Philadelphia used the words “Piracies and Felonies” for the particular purpose of limiting universal jurisdiction. Rather, the limitations are a consequence of the words they used, which had well-established
public meanings.
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B. Evolution in Common and International Law
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, customary international law was widely regarded as part of American general law. Indeed,
the common law explicitly incorporated certain aspects of the law of nations, like the definition and universal status of piracy.33 Thus, when it was
relevant, judges would feel free to look at the law of nations even in the absence of a statute. However, all agreed that Congress could trump the law
of nations through legislation,34 and certainly the Constitution could limit its
application.35 This remains the view today.
At the same time, the Constitution explicitly uses terms of art from
both the common law and the law of nations, partially incorporating them
by reference. Indeed, even if customary international law does not apply of
its own force after the post-Erie abandonment of general common law, the
Constitution’s use of common law and international law terms makes those
bodies of law the standard for understanding the Constitution itself.36 In
other words, customary international law is domestic law only when the
Constitution makes it so. By invoking terms of customary international law
or the common law, the Constitution partially incorporates the associated
bodies of law, but only insofar as they are relevant to understanding the
terms in the Constitution.37
33

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.)
(“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.”).
35
See Chislom v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“The Conventional Law of Nations . . . [cannot] otherwise apply [to the case] than as furnishing rules of interpretation, since unquestionably the people of the United States had a right to form what kind of union, and
upon what terms they pleased . . . . If upon a fair construction of the Constitution of the United States,
the power contended for really exists, it undoubtedly may be exercised, though it be a power of the first
impression. If it does not exist . . . ten thousand examples of similar powers would not warrant its assumption.” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)).
36
See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551 (2006); see
also Sarah Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2006) (“In its strongest
form, the Constitution textually commands consideration of international law through [Clause Ten]
. . . .”).
37
For common law, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (holding that the constitutional right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” refers to common law right
of confrontation at the time of the Founding). For international law, see Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas.
1099, 1101 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, C.J.) (“Whenever doubts and questions arise relative to
the validity, operation or construction of treaties . . . [these] must be settled according to the maxims and
principles of the laws of nations applicable to the case.”); Ware v. Hylton, (C.C.D. Va. 1793) (Iredell,
J.), in 7 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 264–68 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 2003) (turning to the law of nations to determine construction and validity of U.S. treaty);
and United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857) (Story, J.) (“The
existence, therefore, of the common law is not only supposed by the [C]onstitution, but is appealed to
for the construction and interpretation of its powers.”). See also JAMES MADISON, Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the Senate, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 91 n.1 (Gaillard Hunt
34
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An even broader view of the common law’s role in understanding the
Constitution would be to take certain late eighteenth-century common law
principles as providing a gloss or background without which the entire Constitution could not be understood. In this view, international law limits
might be constitutional but not textual,38 much like sovereign immunity39
and limitations on standing.40
John Quincy Adams laid out the “background rules” approach to the
relevance of international law to constitutional interpretation:
The legislative powers of Congress are . . . limited to specific grants contained
in the Constitution itself, all restricted on one side by the power of internal legislation within the separate States, and on the other, by the laws of nations . . . .
These are not subject to the legislative authority of any one nation, and they
are, therefore, not included within the powers of Congress.41

In the very next breath, Adams expressed the narrower explicitincorporation view, while providing an apt summary of this Article’s thesis:
The powers of declaring war, of regulating commerce, of defining and punishing piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses AGAINST
THE LAW OF NATIONS, are among the special grants to Congress, but over
that law itself, thus expressly recognised, and all-comprehensive as it is, Congress has no alterative power.42

Given that the Constitution refers to international law for a definition of its
terms, it raises the question of whether the terms lock in the law of 1789 or
whether they track the constant changes and evolutions in the body of law
to which they refer. The same question arises with the many constitutional
terms referring to common law concepts. The topic is a major one in its
own right. The conclusion of the Article briefly touches on this question, as
possible answers have different implications for universal jurisdiction under
Clause Ten today.
For the purposes of this Article, in considering the opinions expressed
by the Framers, the first Supreme Court Justices, and early Congresses, it is
ed., 1910) (“The case of diplomatic missions belongs to the Law of Nations, and the principles & usages
on which that is founded are entitled to a certain influence in expounding the provisions of the Constitution which have relation to such missions.”).
38
See Cleveland, supra note 36, at 33 (observing that the Supreme Court sometimes looks to
“background” norms of jurisdiction under international law because of “the assumption that the constitutional system implicitly received and distributed certain powers of government and rights of individuals
that were recognized under international law,” and that this use of international law “involves a mixture
of resort to international law as binding and persuasive authority”).
39
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
40
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting the “traditional common-law cause of action at the conceptual core of the case-or-controversy requirement”).
41
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION 71 (New York, Samuel Colman
1839).
42
Id. (last emphasis added).
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crucial to identify the source of any obstacle they perceived to universal jurisdiction. Much of their discussion mentioned international law, which
could be relevant either by virtue of its own direct applicability or through
its incorporation in the Constitution. This Article is only concerned with
the latter use of international law, because as a matter of domestic law, international law by its own force cannot trump clear statutes.
II. ORIGINS OF THE CLAUSE
The Define and Punish Clause was among the least controversial in the
Constitution. It represented an incremental and obvious improvement on a
similar provision in the Articles of Confederation.43 It received little “serious” discussion at the Philadelphia Convention44 and seems not to have
been an issue at all during the ratification process. Nonetheless, an examination of the clause’s origins, text, purposes, and the few statements about it
by the Framers, when taken together, greatly illuminates the scope of the
clause.
Courts and commentators often mistakenly construe the Piracies and
Felonies provision as granting a single power.45 However, the two words
have different meanings and convey distinct competencies. The authority
over felonies covers a wider range of conduct but is narrower in its extraterritorial scope than piracy. Piracy has until recently been a unique crime—
the only one to which universal jurisdiction attached. The Constitution
mentions piracy separately from two broader terms that would be thought to
encompass it—“felonies” and “offenses.” Piracy’s unique status as a universal jurisdiction offense suggests that its separate enumeration in Clause
Ten specifically allows Congress to exercise universal jurisdiction over that
particular type of offense—but not over other high seas crimes or international law offenses.

43

ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX, § 1, cl. 6 (only allowing for the “appointing of courts for the trial of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas,” and not for the definition or punishment of those
crimes).
44
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1160 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
45
See, e.g., United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that these “parallel” provisions are interchangeable terms); United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 824–25 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that drug smuggling in international waters is a “piracy or felony within the meaning
of Article I, Section 8, Clause Ten” without specifying whether it is justified by the power over piracies
or over felonies); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that
the MDLEA is justified by Congress’s authority under the Piracies and Felonies provision without specifying whether drug smuggling is piracy or a felony). But see United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 721,
724 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Supreme Court has “treat[ed] ‘Piracies,’ ‘Felonies on the high Seas,’
and ‘Offenses against the Laws of Nations’ as three separate” categories, and noting that the MDLEA is
an exercise of the felonies power).
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A. The Drafting
1. The Articles of Confederation.—The phrase “piracies and felonies” first appeared in the Articles of Confederation in a provision giving
Congress exclusive power to “appoint[] courts for the trial of piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas.”46 The reasons for including this in the
Articles do not appear to have been discussed, probably because its utility
was evident.47
“Piracies and felonies” was a well-known legal formula for maritime
crimes, used in the leading statutes and treatises.48 Coke’s massively influential work speaks of “piracies[] and felonies,”49 even though piracies were
a subspecies of felony. In a historical note typical of his erudite work, Coke
explains that piracy was not originally a common law felony, but rather a
crime cognizable only in admiralty, which was civil law.50 However, under
Henry VIII, piracy was brought within the common law processes by statute and denominated a felony.51 By the late seventeenth century, felony had
come to mean any very serious crime, especially those punishable by
death.52 Thus, the popular or public meaning of felony by 1776 would have
subsumed piracy.
The Framers were aware of the historical difference between piracy
and felony jurisdiction, and Madison went so far as to suggest that it was

46

ARTS. OF CONFED. art. IX. State constitutions lacked analogous provisions; such power fell
within their general criminal jurisdiction. Some royal charters had specified that the colonial authorities
had power to take military action against pirates; piracy was sometimes understood as being closer to
war than crime. See, e.g., CHARTER OF CAROLINA art. XV (1663) (authorizing local authorities “to
make war and pursue [pirates and robbers] . . . even without the limits of the said province . . . to vanquish and take them, and, being taken to put them to death by the law of war, or to save them, at their
pleasure”).
47
Some small differences can be found between the final Articles and the first draft, prepared by a
committee led by John Dickinson in June 1776, just a month after Congress called for a constitution to
be written. The first version presented to Congress in the summer of 1776, authorized “[a]ppointing
Courts for the Trial of all Crimes, Frauds & Piracies committed on the High Seas . . . .” 5 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1778, at 550 (Worthington Chauncy Ford ed., 1906). The “frauds”
on the high seas are a mystery; it is not clear what the term meant or why it was dropped.
48
See CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 445–46.
49
SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 111 (London, W. Clarke and Sons 1817).
50
Id. at 112 (“[P]iracy, or robbery on the high sea was no felony, whereof the common law took
any knowledge, . . . but was only punishable by the civill law . . . .”).
51
See Report to Congress on Draft Ordinance for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies (Sept. 29,
1785) (statement of John Jay) [hereinafter Jay, Report], in 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 797 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *71 (writing that statues have made piracy a “felony” in English law).
52
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *94 (defining felony as crime with significant and often capital punishment).
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the reason that the term “felony” itself would not suffice.53 But it is implausible that piracy was mentioned separately simply to make clear that America’s common law courts could reach piracy. In 1776, piracy had been a
common law felony for 250 years. It seems preposterous that the drafters
would think that merely saying felonies without mentioning piracies would
repeal the effect of the ancient statute of Henry VIII, making piracy a case
that a jury could not try.54
Indeed, the situation described by Coke was irrelevant in the colonies,
where neither high seas felonies nor robberies were tried by common law
courts. A 1700 statute put most maritime crimes near the colonies within
the purview of the admiral, as it had originally been before the statute of
Henry VIII.55 The result was that in 1776 both piracy and maritime felonies
were tried before special admiralty courts in the colonies, while in England
both were tried in common law courts.56 Madison’s discussion of the ancient history of piracy as being in a different category from felony simply
shows that he was very familiar with Coke, but not that this history was
relevant to the drafting of the Articles. Rather, “piracies and felonies” was
an established legal formula. While the difference between the two in terms
of forum had long been eliminated, differences in jurisdictional scope remained, of which the drafters were also certainly aware.
Under the Articles, Congress lacked the power to define the substance
of these offenses.57 Thus the courts, manned by state court judges drafted
into a concurrent federal service,58 would draw the definition of the crimes
from the common law.59 Nor did Congress have any power over offenses
against the law of nations, which remained entirely within the jurisdiction
of the states. Soon after the Articles had been drafted, many concluded that
it had been a mistake not to also grant a power to define these “piracies and

53

Madison noted the difference during the Philadelphia Convention. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 473–74 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (noting that
“felony at common law” was a vague term, but not so with piracy, and referring to historic statutes on
the subject); see also Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 798.
54
Indeed, the original practice in England appears to have been to try pirates and other sea criminals
in ordinary courts; a statute of Edward III in 1361 moved piracies to special royal tribunals, where they
would be prosecuted until Henry VIII returned them to law nearly two hundred years later. CROSSKEY,
supra note 8, at 446–47.
55
See id. at 445–446, 450.
56
Id. at 452–53.
57
STORY, supra note 44, § 1153.
58
Ordinance for Establishing Courts for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies Committed on the High
Seas, in 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 354, 354–55 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1912); see also James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 207–08 (2007) (distinguishing Congress’s power under the Articles of Confederation to deputize state courts to hear high seas crimes from
its power to establish a uniquely federal court of appeals for captures cases).
59
See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797–98.
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felonies.”60 As a result of the omission, the punishment of offenses on U.S.flagged vessels would depend on the state where the crime was adjudicated.61 Two identical acts on the same ship, involving the same people,
could have different legal consequences if prosecuted in different states.
2. Philadelphia.—At the Constitutional Convention, Clause Ten
generated no excitement. The drafters took the “Piracies and Felonies”
phrase from the Articles and expanded it by giving Congress legislative and
not just judicial power in these areas, as well as over “Offenses against the
Law of Nations.” Presumably, “Piracies and Felonies” referred to the same
thing that it had in the Articles.62 Yet no one has ever suggested that Congress under the Articles could establish courts for the “trial . . . of felonies
on the high seas” aboard foreign vessels with no U.S. connection.
The need to strengthen Congress’s criminal powers over these crimes
was assumed by the delegates at the convention. There is no recorded discussion of the clause until it appeared in the Committee of Detail’s report.
That version varied little from the text that would ultimately be adopted.63
The brief debate that followed focused not on the types of crimes Congress
could deal with, but rather on what it meant for Congress to “define” and
“punish” them.64 The original draft allowed Congress to “declare the law of
. . . .” An effort to strike these words failed, and after toying with “desig-

60

After the final draft of the Articles of Confederation had been submitted to the states, a proposal
was made to modify Article IX by allowing the federal courts to “declar[e] what acts committed on the
high seas shall be deemed piracies and felonies.” See STORY, supra note 44, § 1153 n.4. The motion
failed 9-2, probably because Congress did not want to reopen the Articles for revision once they had
been submitted to the states, as many states had submitted a long list of relatively minor drafting revisions. Id.; 11 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 651–58 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908).
61
See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797.
62
See United States v. Mackenzie, 30 F. Cas. 1160, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 18,313) (observing
that when the Convention “transferred to the new constitution the language of the confederation in relation to the government of the land and naval forces, and the spirit of the provision in respect to piracies
and felonies, it is natural to suppose that these provisions were understood in the same sense, and were
designed to convey the same power, as that affixed to them in the usages and practices under the preceding government”).
63
The Committee on Detail’s draft provided for the power “To declare the law and punishment of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas . . . .” MADISON, supra note 53, at 389. This of course
was what South Carolina had thought the Articles should have said. Interestingly, the committee’s draft
sandwiched the punishment of counterfeiting between “Piracies and Felonies” and “Offenses against the
Law of Nations,” suggesting they saw themselves as enumerating Congress’s overall criminal powers
rather than merely elaborating those that might bear most on foreign relations or extraterritorial offenses.
64
Id. at 472–74.
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nate” as a substitution,65 the delegates settled on Madison and Randolph’s
proposed “define” instead of “declare the law.”66
While this discussion seems no less “obscure” today than it did to Justice Story two hundred years ago,67 the general concern seems to have been
whether the original language would limit Congress too tightly to some preexisting description of the crimes, or whether the amendment gave Congress too much leeway to depart from existing meanings. Some thought it
took too much from the states to give Congress power to define offenses
that already existed in state law.68 Similarly, others felt it would be “arrogance” to purport to define offenses against the law of nations, which all
countries played a joint role in developing.69 The answer to both concerns
was that the specifications of crimes in both the common law and the law of
nations were too uncertain and shifting to provide an administrable and uniform rule.70 The “define” power was necessary to fix the version of the offense, and in Madison’s view, to clarify that international law did not create
individual criminal liability of its own force.71
Nobody said a word about the meaning of “Piracies,” “Felonies,” or
“Offenses.” Nor was there any discussion of whether there was any jurisdictional limit on Congress’s power to define, though it was agreed that
Congress could create substantively new crimes.72
B. The Double Redundancy
The resulting provision, Clause Ten, contains a striking double redundancy. “Piracies” refers to a particular crime. “Felonies,” in contrast, describes a broad category, as does “Offenses against the Law of Nations.”73
Piracy is a subspecies of felony, and one that necessarily occurs on the high
seas. Moreover, piracy was an offense against the law of nations74—indeed,
65

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 316 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). This
proposal was made by Gouverneur Morris because “define . . . being as he conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning.” Id. He was reassured by “others” that the draft’s term was “applicable to the creating of offences also, and therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies.” Id. (emphasis added).
66
MADISON, supra note 53, at 472–74.
67
STORY, supra note 44, § 1162.
68
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 65, at 315 (“Mr. Mason . . .
doubted . . . the propriety of taking the power in all these cases wholly from the States.”).
69
Id. at 615.
70
Id. at 316.
71
Id. (“[N]o foreign law should be a standard farther than is expressly adopted . . . . The proper
remedy for all these difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term ‘define’ in the Natl. legislature.”).
72
See supra note 65.
73
WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 107–08 (2d ed., Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin, 1829) (“Felony . . . when committed on the high seas, amounts to piracy.”).
74
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *68; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 280–81 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (observing that piracy is a crime against the law of nations).
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the “highest Violation,” according to John Jay.75 The first redundancy between piracy and felonies already existed in the predecessor clause in the
Articles. But the phrase does not explain why—if it was redundant—it was
preserved in the Constitution, which the drafters recognized as a different
kind of document, one in which every word would be closely construed.
Indeed, in several instances the drafters condensed and clarified phrases
borrowed from British law that were prone to redundant expressions.76 In
the discussion at Philadelphia, the words “define” and “punish” were parsed
quite carefully. Yet no one said that the new grant of power over “Offenses” made “Piracies” redundant. This suggests that “Piracies” indicates
something that “Offenses” and “Felonies” do not.
Constitutional construction disfavors readings of one provision that
that render another superfluous.77 In the Supreme Court’s first major piracy
case, Justice Story insisted that potentially overlapping words in Clause Ten
take separate meanings.78 A double-redundancy requires investigating
whether anything distinguishes piracy both from other felonies and from
other offenses against the law of nations—whether there might be a reason
for the Constitution treating them differently.79 If piracy has a salient, wellknown feature distinguishing it from other felonies, it would suggest that
the separate enumeration of piracy seeks to emphasize and pick up on that
feature.
Contemporaneous evidence suggests the Framers understood “Piracies
and Felonies” as referring to two distinct powers, with different features
and scope. In 1785, Congress asked John Jay, then head of the Foreign Office, to draft a statute establishing courts for piracy and high-seas felonies
pursuant to Article IX of the Articles of Confederation. In his response, Jay
complained that the Articles did not authorize Congress to “declare” the

75

See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797.
See CROSSKEY, supra note 8, at 456 (explaining that the term “high seas” was a contraction of a
much longer phrase used in British statutes to refer to admiralty jurisdiction).
77
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (rejecting an
interpretation that would make part of the Constitution “mere surplusage,” because “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect”). Redundancy is disfavored,
but not out of the question. For example, Marshall’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in McCulloch v. Maryland makes the Counterfeiting Clause redundant to the power to coin money.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416–17 (1819). However, the presumption is particularly strong within a
clause. See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 252 (2005) (arguing that the anti-redundancy presumption is
weak for provisions in different articles of the Constitution).
78
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (“The power given to Congress is not
merely ‘to define and punish piracies;’ if it were, the words ‘to define,’ would seem almost superfluous,
since the power to punish piracies would be held to include the power of ascertaining and fixing the
definition of the crime.”).
79
Cf. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174 (holding that construing words as redundant “is inadmissible, unless the words require it” (emphasis added)).
76
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definition or punishment of either piracies or felonies.80 However, he continued, because piracy is in a sense an act of war against the nation, it would
be acceptable for the United States to define and punish it; just as the war
power resided on the federal level, so too the power to deal with pirates.81
Jay went on to observe that cases of felonies are “distinguished from Piracy,” and thus Congress was limited to the definitions found in state laws
with respect to them.82 Similarly, at the Federal Convention, delegates
spoke of “piracies” and “felonies” as different things.83 Finally, in United
States v. Smith, the seminal case on piracy, the Court addressed “the authority delegated to Congress upon the subject of piracies” as distinct from its
authority over felonies on the high seas.84 Justice Story also observed in
dicta that the powers involve different legal and policy considerations.85
C. Uniqueness of Piracy
One major difference existed between piracy and the other powers
listed in Clause Ten, lending strength to the view that the separate mention
of “Piracies” set it apart as a distinct power.86 Piracy was jurisdictionally
unique. For as long as sovereignty-based jurisdictional principles have existed (that is, at least since the early seventeenth century) piracy was the
only universal jurisdiction offense.87 The pirate was known in law as hostis

80

See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797.
Id. at 797–78; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–11 (giving Congress power to punish piracy
and declare war).
82
Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 798.
83
See MADISON, supra note 53, at 473–74; THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 74, at 281 (“The
definition of piracies might perhaps without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations . . . . A definition of felonies . . . is evidently requisite.”).
84
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–59 (1820).
85
Id. Similarly, in his treatise on constitutional law, piracies, felonies, and offenses are treated as
distinct aspects of the Clause Ten power. STORY, supra note 44, § 1155.
86
Constitutional construction often involves learning about a term’s meaning from surrounding
terms. For example, the Impeachment Clause, like the Define and Punish Clause, lists several classes of
offenses: “Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Many
scholars argue that the “or” means that the broader category should be understood as expanding on the
characteristics of the two particular illustrations. See Thomas Lee, The Clinton Impeachment and the
Constitution: Introduction to the Federalist Society Panel, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1079, 1086–87 (observing that debates about the text of the clause invoked “the ejusdem generis canon of construction, which
dictates that terms in a list should be construed to be ‘of the same kind’ as the other terms whose company they keep”).
87
See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162 (noting the “general practice of all nations in punishing all
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence against any persons whatsoever”); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159–60 (1795) (“All piracies and trespasses committed
against the general law of nations, are enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any nation . . . .”);
United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 862 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (“[P]iracy under the law of nations which alone is punishable by all nations . . . .” (quoting a speech of John Marshall to Congress)
(emphasis added)); see also United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The class of
81
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humani generis; the offense was almost synonymous with universal jurisdiction.88 The unique jurisdictional status of pirates was not an obscure
piece of legal trivia.89 Piracy was a significant problem, one with which the
public in a maritime nation was generally concerned. Moreover, a legalized
form of piracy—privateering—was almost a national pastime during the
Revolutionary War. The laws of prize were as familiar to the lawyers of the
day as the rules of baseball are today.90 The line between piracy and privateering was perhaps the most important one to know. Though jurisdictionally broad, the crime of piracy was substantively narrow. It consisted
simply of robbery on the high seas.91 Other crimes that occurred on the
high seas were dealt with under traditional jurisdictional principles.92
Thus piracy had a uniform technical meaning as an international law
offense. At the same time, nations could and did attach the term “piracy” to
a variety of different maritime crimes.93 This was done either to draw on
the strong condemnatory connotations attached to the term because it had a
popular meaning of serious or capital offense on the high seas, or simply
out of legislative imprecision and sloppiness. Finally, because piracy in the
classic sense was universally punishable by death, declaring something a piracy meant deeming it severe enough to merit the death penalty.94 So in addition to piracy under the law of nations, different nations made diverse
offenses “municipal” or “statutory piracies.” Nothing limited what a nation
could dub piracy, but such statutory piracy could only be punished within
the particular state’s municipal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction did not
attach to a crime merely by calling it piracy.

crimes subject to universal jurisdiction traditionally included only piracy.”). See generally Kontorovich,
supra note 12, at 190–91 (discussing piracy’s status as the prototypical universal jurisdiction crime).
88
See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 190.
89
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *71 (observing that “every community” has a right to punish
pirates).
90
DONALD A. PETRIE, THE PRIZE GAME: LAWFUL LOOTING ON THE HIGH SEAS IN THE DAYS OF
THE FIGHTING SAIL 37 (1999); see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power to “grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” as privateers’ licenses were known).
91
Smith, 18 U.S. at 161–62 (“[P]iracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery committed within the jurisdiction of the admirality.”); Talbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 160 (“What is called robbery on the land, is piracy if committed at sea.”); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *72 (defining
piracy as “robbery and depredation upon the high seas”).
92
See Kontorovich, supra note 3, at 153–55 (discussing reasons that universal jurisdiction was confined to high seas robbery).
93
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (“A statute may make any offense
piracy, committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute . . . .”).
94
HENRY WHEATON, ENQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF VISITATION
AND SEARCH OF AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE 16
(Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard 1842) (“All that is meant is, that the offence is visited with the pains and
penalties of piracy.”).
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This jurisdictional distinction was well understood,95 yet the careless
use of “piracy” could and did lead to confusion.96 As Wheaton, the American diplomat, reporter of Supreme Court decisions, and author of the leading early nineteenth-century American treatise on international law, put it:
“There are certain acts which are considered piracy by the internal laws of a
State, to which the law of nations does not attach the same signification. . . .
[These laws] can only be applied . . . with reference to its own subjects, and
in places within its own jurisdiction.”97 Thus, “piracy created by municipal
statute can only be punished by that State within whose territorial jurisdiction” or “on board of whose vessels, the offence thus created was committed.”98 This clarification demonstrates that the constitutional distinction
between felonies and piracies should properly track the distinction between
municipal and international, or true, piracy.
D. Summary
When read against the legal backdrop of the Framing, the enumeration
of “Piracies” implies that Congress can punish it the way nations generally
could—without regard to the nationality of the vessel or offender.99 However, if “Felonies” can be punished without regard to a U.S. nexus, then all
distinction between it and “Piracies” falls away. The Constitution may as
well have just said “crimes.” By separating the powers in Clause Ten, the
Constitution keeps their consequences separate. The unique universal jurisdiction powers that all nations exercised over piracy could not be imputed to other crimes that lacked universal jurisdiction status in
international law, even if they resembled piracy in that they occurred on the
high seas or violated international law.
Furthermore, piracy is mentioned separately from “Offenses against
the Law of Nations.” After all, piracy gets its universal jurisdiction status
from international law. One might think that the power to define and punish international law crimes would naturally entail the power to ascribe universal jurisdiction to piracy. The retention of “Piracies,” which was a
holdover from the Articles of Confederation, even after “Offenses” had
been added at the Philadelphia Convention, could suggest that there might
have been some doubt as to whether the “Offenses” provision itself would
authorize universal jurisdiction over piracy. Even with regards to piracy,
95

Id. (“[T]he piracy thus created by municipal statute must not be confounded with piracy under the
law of nations.”); see also 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (distinguishing “piracy under the law of
nations,” or “general piracy,” from “piracy by statute”).
96
See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 600 (1800) (cautioning that “confounding” international and municipal
piracy leads to “indistinct” ideas about jurisdiction).
97
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 124, at 164 (George Grafton Wilson
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1936) (1866).
98
Id.
99
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820) (holding that piracy in the Constitution referred to the well-known and uniform meaning of the term in international law).
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however, such expansive jurisdiction may have seemed an unnecessary
danger. The young Republic tried to avoid judicial proceedings that could
endanger its neutrality.100 Opening U.S. courts to disputes solely about foreigners on matters likely to concern affairs of foreign states could have
forced the nation into the thicket of European politics. Similarly, while today many more offenses fall under universal jurisdiction under international
law, very few nations’ constitutions allow their courts to actually exercise
universal jurisdiction over them.101
Though the text, together with the drafting history, raises a strong argument about the “Felonies” and “Offenses” powers being nonuniversal,
this evidence is too thin to be conclusive. But the very paucity of debate
over the clause suggests something about how it was understood, especially
given the background assumptions about territorial jurisdiction, the purposes of punishment, and the nature of the new union. Given many of the
Framers’ concerns about congressional aggrandizement, it would be odd if
Congress were given authority to legislate universally without an express
statement, or without someone noticing the implication. The debate at the
convention focused on whether it would be impudent to define piracies and
offenses against the law of nations, since these are determined by state practice in general. It would be incongruous for people to voice this concern
but then say nothing about allowing Congress to actually legislate felonies
for the rest of the world. Moreover, one would expect that the AntiFederalist propagandists, who were not shy about exaggerating the potentially imperial powers of the new government, would have raised this issue
during the ratification process.
III. POLICY OF THE CLAUSE
A. Purposes
By granting Congress the Define and Punish power, the Framers
sought to provide a uniform standard of conduct on federal vessels and to
ensure that the national government could deal with crimes that could embroil the country in disputes with foreign powers. The uniformity goal
seems to have dominated at the Philadelphia Convention. Unlike piracy,

100

See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (rejecting jurisdiction
over libel suit brought by British owners of vessel captured by French armed schooner). See generally
David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons From the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1144060 (discussing litigation of
British and French captures in U.S. admiralty courts, and the desire of the government to keep such
cases out).
101
See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL PERSPECTIVES
221 (2003).
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which had a single global meaning and punishment,102 felonies could vary
from state to state. Without a federal power to define the elements and punishment of crimes committed on the high seas, sailors on U.S. vessels could
be subject to multiple criminal codes.103 The lack of an identifiable, uniform body of criminal law to apply to all on board U.S. vessels was seen as
the principal defect of the predecessor clause in the Articles.104 The high
seas are outside of state authority, and ships sailing there were outposts of
U.S. sovereignty, not the sovereignty of a particular state.
Second, the nation as a whole had an interest in the conduct of U.S.flagged vessels and nationals on the high seas, where they would most often
have foreign contacts and thus foreign disputes, but where foreign justice
might not reach them. The entire nation, and not a state, would have to answer for the conduct of U.S. nationals on the high seas or conduct in violation of international law.105 As a result, it was argued that Congress should
possess the power to “define and punish all such offences, which may interrupt our intercourse and harmony with” foreign states.106 This was in keep-

102

See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 131 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (observing
that piracy is generally punished by death).
103
MADISON, supra note 53, at 474 (“If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the
citizens of different States would be subject to different punishments for the same offence at sea.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 74, at 281 (“The meaning of the term [felony], as defined in the codes of
the several States, would be as impracticable as [it] would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is
not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal
laws. For the sake of certainty and uniformity therefore, the power of defining felonies . . . was in every
respect necessary and proper.”).
104
See Jay, Report, supra note 51, at 797 (complaining that the “wise end” of uniformity “cannot be
accomplished . . . in virtue of that Article in the Confederation”).
105
See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 535–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“[T]the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury
ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.”); James Iredell, Charge to the Grand
Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey (Apr. 2, 1793), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT,
1790–1794, at 348, 355 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT] (observing that the Constitution gives the Define and Punish power to Congress because “otherwise they might be [held] accountable for breaches of the Law of Nations committed without their sanction”). Justice Iredell described this power as the flip side of Congress’s war-making
authority: because it would have to decide whether to enter a conflict, it should be given the necessary
powers to avoid one. See id.
106
STORY, supra note 44, § 1160; see also 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. D, at 268–69
(Philadelphia, William Young Birch, and Abraham Small 1803) (suggesting that Congress, rather than
the states, was given power over offenses against international law because of their close link with the
war power and foreign relations).
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ing with British and Colonial legislation, which regulated crimes on the
high seas solely to protect the Crown’s sovereign interests.107
This understanding of the provision’s twin purposes is instructive on
several counts. For one, it makes clear that Clause Ten was about rearranging power between the new federal government and the states, safely entrusting to the national government those powers previously held by the
states.108 The purpose was an internal division of power rather than an outward projection of the jurisdiction.109 John Marshall, shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, argued that unless the states could previously
punish entirely foreign conduct on the high seas, which no one has ever
suggested, then they could not transfer this power to Congress.
[T]hat clause in the Constitution, which enables Congress to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, . . . can never be construed to
make to the government a grant of power, which the people making it do not
themselves possess. . . . [T]he people of the United States have no jurisdiction
over offences committed on board a foreign ship against a foreign nation. Of
consequence, in framing a government for themselves, they cannot have
passed this jurisdiction to that government.110

Providing uniform criminal maritime law to “the citizens of different
states” would make sense only if the Felonies provision applies only to U.S.
citizens as well.111 From the perspective of seamen, a switch from multiple
state definitions to a single federal one creates uniformity.112 But if ex107

See, e.g., An Act Against Piracy and Robbing upon the Sea, passed by Massachusetts Bay Assembly 172–73 (Boston, May 27, 1696), microformed on Early American Imprints, First Series No. 478
(Evans Digital Collection).
108
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at
7 n.24 (2001).
109
Indeed, the States were thought to have retained concurrent jurisdiction over piracy in areas such
as the Chesapeake Bay. See id.; see also 5 TUCKER, supra note 106, ed.’s app. A, at 5.
110
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 607 (1800). This view, if accepted in its entirety, could have major ramifications. It could mean that Congress never has power to violate international law, because the states
could not have delegated what they did not possess under the law of nations. This would make international law, or more precisely international law in 1789, an overarching limit on all governmental action.
Marshall would not take his argument this far; he certainly thought Congress could act contrary to
customary international law. See Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804). As a politician, Marshall may have felt freer to speak more loosely and broadly than he would
when later deciding cases as a Justice. Of course, this could suggest his entire discussion of Clause Ten
in the Robbins affair is problematic. Yet obviously much of it is sincere, as it was echoed later in
Palmer. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 627–30 (1818). A narrower understanding of
his statement in the Robbins matter would regard his statements as an attempt to reconstruct the intent
behind the Define and Punish Clause. The clause, unlike most of the Constitution, specifically refers to
international law as a standard. Thus, Marshall may simply have meant that with no evidence to the
contrary, the clause cannot be understood as expanding the powers of the United States beyond what
was allowable by international law—this would be his Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation
applied to the text of the Constitution itself.
111
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 65, at 316.
112
See id.
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tended to foreigners on foreign vessels, the clause brings “neither uniformity nor stability in the law” to defendants;113 they would be subject to the
laws of a nation with which they had no connection, in addition to the laws
of their home or flag state.
The foreign-relations purpose behind the clause arises only because
“the welfare of the Union is essentially connected with the conduct of our
citizens in regard to foreign nations.”114 Presumably, foreign countries
would only take umbrage at the United States for crimes on the high seas or
against international law when those crimes involved people or instrumentalities somehow connected to the United States. Thus, this reason contemplates the Define and Punish power reaching only cases with a solid
American nexus—the involvement of American nationals or vessels.
Neither purpose of the Felonies provision—the need for uniform laws
or the need to avoid conflict with foreign nations—suggests that the grant
of that power would be thought to extend to foreigners on foreign vessels.
In explaining the need for the clause, James Iredell, a major participant in
the ratification process in the North Carolina legislature and later one of the
first Justices on the Supreme Court, described the matters in Clause Ten as
“immediately affecting the security, the honor or the interest of the United
States at large . . . .”115 Thus, he argued, they should be entrusted to the
“general Legislature of the Union.”116 His use of “immediately” suggests a
direct nexus with the offense, rather than some general or remote “interest.”
An alternate account leading to the same conclusion was provided by
St. George Tucker, one of the most influential jurists of the early Republic.
He saw the Piracies and Felonies power as a necessary corollary of the Foreign Commerce Clause.117 Yet if Congress can regulate activity on the high
seas without any U.S. nexus, such authority would swallow up the Foreign
Commerce Clause, which limits Congress to regulating commerce “with”
foreign nations.118 Such a sweeping reading of the Felonies power cannot
be accepted without support from some evidence from the Framers.
B. Background Assumptions
The lack of discussion of the clause’s jurisdictional scope must be understood against the legal background of the time. On the domestic side,
113

MADISON, supra note 53, at 474.
STORY, supra note 44, § 1160 (emphasis added).
115
James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, 1788, as reprinted in
1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 449, 452 (1971) (emphasis
added).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
TUCKER, supra note 106, app. D, at 268–69 (explaining that the Constitution grants Congress the
Define and Punish powers because any activity on the high seas implicates foreign commerce, which
“must necessarily be transacted by communication on the high seas”).
114
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Congress was widely seen as a body with limited and defined powers, with
particularly narrow criminal jurisdiction.119 The “high seas” has always
been the indispensable conduit of a vast range of commercial and military
activity. If the Felonies power had no jurisdictional limit besides the locus,
it would, with a single word, turn Congress from a body of limited powers
into a world legislature.
Moreover, jurisdiction was still formalistic and heavily territorial. This
followed the principle that a nation’s jurisdiction is an outgrowth of its sovereignty and that its sovereignty is territorial. Thus, no nation could have
jurisdiction outside its sovereign domain except with the consent of another
nation. Chief Justice Marshall powerfully stated the territorial view of sovereignty and jurisdiction in The Schooner Exchange.120 He noted in dicta
that jurisdiction over foreigners extended only to their acts committed
within the United States. Such jurisdiction was required because it would
be “obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society” to immunize foreigners.121 There was little difference between jurisdictional overreaching and
the invasion of another country’s foreign prerogatives.122 Because of this, it
was widely thought that the inherent attributes of nationhood would disable
a country from exercising jurisdiction on a universal basis.123
Certain eighteenth-century political and legal theorists heavily influenced the views of the Founding generation. The impact of writers like
Emmerich de Vattel cannot be underestimated.124 An appreciation of some
119

See id. at 269 (observing that Congress is not entrusted with “general” power over crimes, but
rather over “but a few offences [which] are selected from the great mass of crimes with which society
may be infested”).
120
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812) (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.”).
121
Id. at 144.
122
See, e.g., Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1103 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, J.) (“It is to
be remembered, that every nation is, and ought to be, perfectly and absolutely sovereign within its own
dominions, to the entire exclusion of all foreign power, interference and jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis
added)); see also 5 TUCKER, supra note 106, ed.’s app. A, at 5 (“The cognizance of all crimes and misdemeanours committed within the body of any state . . . belongs exclusively to the jurisdiction of that
state. . . . And in like manner the cognizance of all crimes and misdemeanours committed on the high
seas (where all nations have a common jurisdiction) by citizens of the same state against each other; or,
by common pirates, or robbers, against the citizens of any state, belongs to that particular state to whose
citizens the injury is offered.”).
123
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 26 (New York, O. Halsted 1826) (“The
subjects of all nations meet [on the ocean], in time of peace, on a footing of entire equality and independence. No nation has any right or jurisdiction at sea, except it be over the persons of its own subjects, in its own vessels . . . .”).
124
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 463 n.12 (1978) (noting that Vattel was the most cited authority on international law during the first fifty years of the Republic, and relying on his scholarship to determine the meaning of the terms “treaty” and “compact” as used in the
Constitution). Students of Vattel included Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton;
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of their views on extraterritorial jurisdiction helps demonstrate the general
presumptions in place at the time. The authors most influential among the
Framers understood society as a compact among individuals, who previously enjoyed an anarchic autonomy. Governments acquired from their
subjects the power to deal with crimes. The government can only have the
rights previously possessed by individuals—namely, self-defense. Thus,
criminal law is justified only so long as it protects the society itself.125
Thus, the social contract theory of punishment is inherently isolationist or
inward-looking.
The leading international scholars saw jurisdiction as essentially territorial, though they recognized exceptions for particular crimes. If someone
were to commit crimes in his home state and flee to another, the latter cannot punish him for crimes committed elsewhere. As Vattel described it,
“the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories.”126 Nonetheless, Vattel
said, “we ought to except from this rule those villains, who, by the nature
and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race.”127 Because such individuals “attack all nations,” they can be punished by all.128 Vattel regarded
universal jurisdiction as limited and extraordinary.129 Moreover, he viewed
it as limited to crimes that, like piracy, directly endanger all nations and are
recognized as universal by international custom.
The Framers would not likely have thought long on this question without consulting the vastly influential Dutch jurist and publicist Cornelius van
Bynkershoek.130 He thought the permissibility of universal jurisdiction was
a “difficult” matter.131 While generally negatively disposed toward it, he
grudgingly suggested a narrow exception for certain in rem proceedings before prize courts. When a nation would bring a prize ship into a third country’s port, claims could be made against the captor by the alleged proper
owners of the prize.132 Admiralty courts heard such libels even when the
Hamilton frequently cited Vattel in his cabinet opinions and public arguments. See DANIEL GEORGE
LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 11, 65 (1985).
125
See 1 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE
§§ 169, 232 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758).
126
Id. § 233.
127
Id. Vattel cites pirates as the main example of this “exception” in state practice, though he
seems to wish to extend it to poisoners and “incendiaries by profession.” Id.
128
Id.
129
See id.
130
His work is often discussed in Founding-era arguments about the law of nations and is cited at
least twenty times in Supreme Court opinions through 1820. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Justice Story described him as “of the highest authority.”
The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 697, 701 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 4479).
131
1 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUESTIONS OF PUBLIC LAW § 129 (1737), in 2 THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (James Brown Scott ed., Tenney Frank trans., 1930).
132
Id.
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claimants and captors were foreign.133 Yet van Bynkershoek only discussed
criminal or in personam universal jurisdiction in relation to piracy.
A brief examination of some of the leading writers on international law
who informed the Framers’ views shows that these scholars regarded universal jurisdiction as aberrational or problematic.134 Of course, the Framers,
or subsequent interpreters, were free to diverge from these views with respect to Congress’s powers. However, given this intellectual background,
their silence about the jurisdictional scope of the Felonies and Offenses
power suggests it was at least not intended as granting these powers on a
universal basis.
C. Summary
The little affirmative evidence suggests that universal jurisdiction
would be in tension with the goals of Clause Ten—providing a uniform rule
on board U.S. vessels from different states and providing a federal rule and
remedy for crimes that might be likely to disturb relations between the
United States. and other nations. Moreover, allowing for general universal
jurisdiction over any felony at sea would be in tension with the widespread
understandings of sovereignty and jurisdiction that informed the Framers.
While the Constitution could give Congress powers that would conflict with
these background assumptions, it would require some affirmative evidence
from the Framing, or strong textual evidence, to conclude that it had done
so. In the absence of such evidence, it seems safest to interpret the clause
consistently with its purposes, the expectations of its authors, and as shown
in Part II, the likely meaning of its terms to a contemporaneous reader.
IV. MURDER ON THE HIGH SEAS
With one exception, Congress did not use the Piracies and Felonies
Clause to legislate universally over anything but piracy itself until the
MDLEA. Given the vast array of foreign high seas conduct that was avail133

See id.; Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs,
53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39, 46–50 (2008) (explaining how admiralty courts functioned in the early Republic
as international courts exercising universal jurisdiction in matters of captures).
134
Jeremy Bentham, not surprisingly, had an approach to universal jurisdiction that was quite different from previous commentators. He had no objection to a country exercising jurisdiction over conduct with no nexus to the forum, purely “for the sake of mankind at large.” See JEREMY BENTHAM, Of
Subjects, or of the Personal Extent of the Dominion of the Laws, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
540, 543 (John Bowring ed., London, Simpkin, Marshal & Co. 1843) (arguing that jurisdiction should be
based on nothing more than the offender’s physical presence because any other criterion could lead to
multiple conflicting jurisdictional claims, whereas a person can only be in one place at a time). Bentham, of course, was not a treatise-writer, and certainly did not purport to describe practice, only an idealized regime of jurisdiction. Indeed, while Bentham coined the term “international law” in this work, it
was apparently never cited in the courts of the early Republic. Furthermore, his work was not available
to the drafters of the Constitution, as it was only finished in 1789 and published posthumously by his
executor. See 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM § VII, supra.
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able for criminalization in the Age of Sail, this congressional silence itself
is telling. As Part V will show, Congress at one point contemplated attaching universal jurisdiction to a nonpiratical felony, but decided such an act
would be unconstitutional.
This Part will discuss the only enacted measure that seemed to provide
universal jurisdiction for felonies. Some of the leading jurists of the time—
and indeed in the nation’s history—quickly challenged the universal treatment of crimes other than piracy. The statute eventually occasioned the
only Supreme Court rulings on the scope of Congress’s power to punish
crimes without a U.S. nexus. While there were a couple of inconclusive
suggestions to the contrary, the preponderance of judicial opinion found
such legislation as exceeding Congress’s Article I powers.
The First Congress exercised the Piracies and Felonies power when it
enacted the first criminal statute in 1790.135 The measure was an omnibus
act, creating every federal crime, such as treason, counterfeiting, and more
common crimes committed in areas of exclusive federal authority.136 It purported to criminalize “murder or robbery” when committed by “any person”
on the high seas.137 Subsequent sections went on to denominate as piracy a
variety of maritime misdeeds, such as “running away with a vessel,” revolt,
assaulting commanders, and attempts and conspiracies to do those things.138
Robbery on the high seas was the international law crime of piracy, or
“general” piracy. But the statute included in the same breath other offenses
that, while dubbed “piracy,” did not amount to such under international law.
This itself should not and did not trouble jurists, who clearly distinguished
between international and statutory, or municipal, piracy.139 The statute,
however, made no jurisdictional distinction between these provisions. The
use of “any person” appears to be an umbrella term, applying equally to
135

An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, 1 Stat. 112, ch. 9

(1790).
136

Id. The bill received little discussion in Congress, with the sections that could be read as establishing universal jurisdiction apparently going entirely unremarked. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 93–95 (1997).
137
Section 8 of the Crimes Act provided that:
[I]f any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay,
out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if
committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with
death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run
away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield
up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his
commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed
to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of
crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state,
shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.
1 Stat. 112, ch. 9, § 8 (emphasis added).
138
Id. §§ 9–12.
139
See Joseph Story, A Charge Delivered to the Grand Juries of the Circuit Court (1819), reprinted
in 1 THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE AND AMERICAN COURTS 1, 2 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).
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robbery as well as all the other enumerated offenses. A literal reading
would extend U.S. jurisdiction universally to a wide variety of crimes
aboard any vessel on the high seas, and even to some offenses on land.
None of these crimes were universally cognizable. It is unlikely that Congress intended the law to have such broad reach. Given the narrowness
with which it otherwise tailored its criminal powers, there is no indication
that Congress sought to begin its career by legislating a criminal code for all
ships around the world.140 The reasons, if any, for the language are unknown.141 Several courts blamed it on shoddy draftsmanship,142 which
would have been understandable given the massive work of the First Congress.
A. Grand Jury Charges
The statute immediately raised doubts as to its legality, which persisted
until they were resolved by the Supreme Court in 1820. The year after its
enactment, two Supreme Court Justices discussed it while giving grand jury
instructions. At the time, grand jury charges were lengthy disquisitions on
criminal law, the Constitution, the role of the jury, and related political matters.143 Justice James Wilson surveyed the entire corpus of federal criminal
law—all thirty-two sections of the Act of 1790—for the edification of the
Virginia grand jurors.144
Upon reaching section 8 of the Act, Wilson expressed “an official obligation to state some doubts” about the statute’s apparent extension of universal jurisdiction beyond classic piracy.145 These doubts consume the next
three pages of his instructions. While noting his “diffidence” to the “power
140

See Anonymous Case, 1 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 447) (“In some of its provisions, the words, if literally and strictly taken, go far beyond what could have been the intention of the
writer; and the act has in some respects copied too closely the act of 39 Geo. III., without adverting to
the difference in our constitutions.”).
141
The 1781 statute establishing federal courts for high seas crimes described their jurisdiction as
extending to “all and every person and persons who . . . hereafter shall commit, any piracy or felony
upon the high seas.” Ordinance for Establishing Courts for the Trial of Piracies and Felonies Committed on the High Seas, supra note 58, at 355 (emphasis added). No one has contended that this provision
sought to grant universal jurisdiction over the high seas to the newly created courts. Interestingly, the
similar language of the 1781 ordinance was never mentioned in the decades-long debate over the scope
of its 1790 replacement. If anything, the earlier enactment used even broader language. See id. at 354–
55.
142
See United States v. Bowers, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 191, 195 (1820) (bemoaning “the obvious want
of precision in language and in thought, discoverable in the act of 1790”); Anonymous Case, 1 F.Cas. at
1003 (“The act of 1790 was very unskillfully written.”).
143
See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229,
243 n.37 (1990) (noting that grand jury charges were often “political events” reprinted verbatim in
newspapers).
144
See James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia
(May 1791), in 3 WORKS OF THE HON. JAMES WILSON 354 (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804).
145
Id. at 374.
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and legislative authority of the United States,” he suggested the murder
provisions of the law went beyond such power.146 Wilson noted the wellknown distinction between general piracy and other maritime crimes that a
nation may penalize. This distinction existed regardless of whether the latter are dubbed “piracies” by statute. If a nation wished to legislate beyond
the international law definition, it could do so in cases “affecting only its
citizens.”147
As to section 8, Wilson first urged a narrower reading of the murder
provision, arguing that Congress could not have meant to give the same
reach to the laws of piracy and murder, given the well-known difference between them.148 If, however, Congress did mean the law “to extend, in its
operation, to persons not citizens of the United States,” Justice Wilson suggested it “could not be carried into effect” by the courts.149 While his
charge repeatedly invoked the “law of nations” and did not cite the Constitution, this last sentence suggests that Wilson, who had been a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, understood the limitation to be constitutional. Wilson, like most lawyers at the time, saw international law as part
of the common law background against which the Constitution and federal
laws must be construed. Yet even the strongest supporters of this view
conceded that both the Constitution and laws of the United States trumped
contrary customary international law.150 Thus, if the Define and Punish
Clause authorized universal jurisdiction over any high seas crimes, Congress would be entitled to exercise such jurisdiction despite the conflict
with international law. There was no authority other than the Constitution
for invalidating a statute, as Wilson said he would do.
Justice Iredell adverted to the issue in a much more cursory discussion
and came to a different conclusion. Addressing the New Jersey grand jury
two years later, he suggested that international law principles bear directly
on the scope of Clause Ten. Unlike Wilson, he maintained that all nations
share a common jurisdiction over all high seas crimes, though he offered no

146

Id.
Id. at 376. This view construed jurisdiction more narrowly than anyone else would, as it would
presumably prevent the punishment of foreigners on U.S. vessels.
148
Id. at 374–77. Marshall would reject this approach, as it would require giving a common chapeau provision, “any person,” different meaning when applied to two different subsequent terms. Instead of narrowing the scope of “any person” as applied to murder, he chose to narrow “any person”
itself. While this is in some tension with the plain language, it at least allows the plain language to mean
one thing, rather than have some Heisenberg-like property. See infra text accompanying notes 184–187,
194–206.
149
Id. at 377. The statement also is important as an overlooked early foreshadowing of the judicial
review that would come into clear view in Marbury v. Madison.
150
See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 449 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Constitution trumps contrary international law, because “unquestionably the people of the United
States had a right to form what kind of union, and upon what terms they pleased, without reference to
any former examples”).
147
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basis for the view.151 In a subsequent charge, he suggested that the United
States had universal jurisdiction over at least certain nonpiratical crimes on
the high seas.152 Anticipating modern universal jurisdiction, which is based
on the heinousness of the crime, he said that “murder or piracy” could be
punished by any nation because they are “so atrocious in their nature” that
“all nations concur in punishing them” and because the high seas are outside the jurisdiction of any particular nation.153 He did not explain how this
fits with Clause Ten, which mentions piracy but not murder. Surely if murder were universally cognizable, it would not have become so in the few
years since the Philadelphia Convention. His first, broader jury charge suggested a belief in a jus gentium, a “universal law of society” that the United
States, like all other nations, merely applies in admiralty cases.154
These views are somewhat inconsistent with each other and hard to
understand on their own terms, as they conflict with the well-established
contemporary view that only piracy was universally cognizable.155 Moreover, it is in tension with views he expressed during the ratification suggesting that the purpose of Clause Ten was to reach crimes committed by or
against Americans.156 The suggestion that high seas were an “extraterritorial” jurisdiction also had little basis. While the “high seas” themselves
could not be regulated by any nation, ships were literal extensions of a nation’s territory.157
Wilson thought that he would soon see a case testing the scope of the
Crimes Act. Such a case did not arise directly until the late 1810s. In 1819,
151

Iredell, supra note 105 at 355 (“[Congress] has express authority given in the Constitution to define and punish Piracies and Felonies . . . and Offences [committed] against the law of nations. Crimes
that are committed upon the High Seas, are not the objects of any Law merely territorial, that is, a Law
resting entirely on the discretion of the Legislature of the Country, but being Crimes equally against all
the Nations in the world, are equally punishable in any, and therefore must have some common principle.”).
152
James Iredell, Charge to Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina
(May 7, 1798) [hereinafter Iredell, South Carolina Grand Jury Charge], in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 105, at 258. Iredell does not mention the Crimes Act directly, and
thus it is not clear how focused he was on the universality issue. His discussion of high seas crimes was
apparently prompted by the involvement of Americans in French vessels operating against the British
off the Carolina shore. See Letter from James Iredell to Hanna Iredell (May 8, 1798), in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 105, at 263.
153
Iredell, South Carolina Grand Jury Charge, supra note 152.
154
Iredell, supra note 105 (“Laws concerning crimes of this nature ought to be materially the same
in every country.”).
155
Cf. Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 240–41 & n.29 (explaining that some Enlightenment thinkers
had a “lingering” belief that all law was universal, with each nation attempting to understand the same
general law as all others, and thus there would be nothing unfair about applying jurisdiction to foreigners because jurisdictional differences were of little consequence).
156
See Iredell, supra note 115.
157
See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 631, 641 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 14,865) (Chase,
J.) (charging the jury: “All vessels, whether public or private, are part of the territory and within the jurisdiction of the nation to which they belong. This is according to the law of nations.”).
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Justice Story delivered instructions to a grand jury that directly anticipated
the controversies of the coming year. Story adopted and expanded Wilson’s narrow view of universal jurisdiction over Iredell’s broader conception.158 Story stated that the statute “is manifestly designed to apply to all
cases,” including foreigners on foreign ships. However, crimes merely
called “piracy” by U.S. law are punishable only when there is American involvement.159 Story thus distinguished between Congress’s power to punish
piracy as defined by the law of nations and other crimes, regardless of
whether the statute called them “piracy.” This insistence on the distinction
between piracy proper and everything else directly corresponds to the constitutional distinction between piracies and felonies.
B. John Marshall and Jonathan Robbins
1. The Robbins Affair.—The Jonathan Robbins affair—a highly politicized dispute over the extradition of a mutineer to Britain—resulted in the
first extended discussion of the scope of Congress’s high seas criminal jurisdiction. The Robbins flap pulled in the courts, the President, Congress,
and the press. At its climax, freshman legislator John Marshall delivered an
extraordinary speech on the floor of the House, which demonstrated a definite view of the Piracies and Felonies provision, closely anticipating the
views he would express from the bench two decades later in the only cases
squarely dealing with the issue.
In 1797, mutineers overthrew (overboard) the officers of the British
warship Hermione.160 The brutality of the revolt made Britain particularly
intent on bringing the perpetrators to justice. In subsequent years, some of
the crew, now on other vessels, wound up in American ports, where they
were arrested. In March 1798, three of the mutineers were arrested in Perth
Amboy. One was apparently an American, while the other two were probably foreigners;161 the concept of nationality was fuzzier at the time, and particularly difficult to apply to immigrants like Americans and migrants like
seamen. Britain immediately requested their extradition under the Jay
Treaty, which required both countries to “deliver up to justice [in the other
country], all persons, who, being charged with murder or forgery committed
within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the
countries of the other.”162

158

See Story, supra note 139.
Id.
160
The discussion of the background to the Robbins affair is drawn from Wedgwood, supra note
143, at 235–38.
161
But see Extradition, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 83 (Mar. 14, 1798) (suggesting that all three may have
been Americans).
162
Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. XXVII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat.
116, 129 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].
159
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The extradition request was considered at the highest levels of government. A question immediately arose about the meaning of “jurisdiction.” Certainly, a British frigate was manifestly within His Majesty’s
jurisdiction. The United States had some proprietary jurisdictional claim
with respect to the American defendant, but not the other two. If “jurisdiction of either” meant each nation’s exclusive jurisdiction, then the treaty
would not require extradition in cases where the crime fell within both nations’ jurisdictions. With respect to the foreigners, their mutiny on a British
warship could only be within U.S. jurisdiction if it was universally cognizable and if the Constitution would allow the punishment of such “foreign”
crimes in American courts.
2. Opinions on U.S. Jurisdiction.—Attorney General Charles Lee
and Secretary of State Timothy Pickering disagreed on this last point.163 In
a brief opinion, Lee wrote that the 1790 Crimes Act allowed the punishment
of murder on the high seas even though one of the mutineers was possibly
foreign.164 He did not explain how such jurisdiction would be consistent
with the Constitution or law of nations.165 However, the mutineers had not
merely seized the vessel, but also sold it to the Spanish, thus robbing the
ship owners.166 Because Lee’s letter dealt with both murder and piracy, he
could still have regarded U.S. jurisdiction as based fundamentally on the
latter. He could have seen the case as an exercise of pendent jurisdiction.167
On the other hand, like Iredell’s second jury instruction, he may have
thought murder was also universally cognizable under international law.
Lee’s view did not prevail. The defendants were indicted for piracy
before a federal grand jury. Only the undisputedly American defendant was
charged with murder, despite Lee’s broad views about the reach of section 8
of the Crimes Act. Piracy was not only universally cognizable, it was also
not extraditable by the terms of the Jay Treaty. Indeed, another provision
clearly contemplated that each country would itself punish pirates against
the other when found within their respective territories.168 This case was not
the best vehicle for disentangling the treatment of piracy from murder, as
they allegedly occurred together. (Whether mutiny counted as piracy in in-
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Extradition, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 83.
Id. at 84 (“I deem it more becoming the justice, honor, and dignity of the United States, that the
trial should be in our courts.”); see also Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 277–78 (describing Lee’s view
that murder and piracy can be punished “on board any vessel whatever”).
165
Professor Rubin sees in the tone of the remark more bombast than analysis. See ALFRED P.
RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 142 (2d ed. 1998) (“[I]t seems likely that Lee was making a broader argument for new national pride and policy reasons than a closer examination of the case and more mature
judgment would warrant.”).
166
See Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 272 n.162.
167
See id.
168
Jay Treaty, supra note 162, art. XX, 8 Stat. at 126–27.
164
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ternational law was itself unclear.) A brief trial resulted in an acquittal after
twenty minutes of deliberations.169
The fate of Robbins took an entirely different course and inspired different legal views. In February 1799, a certain Nathan or Jonathan Robbins
was arrested in Charleston, South Carolina. He was said to be Thomas
Nash, one of the Hermione mutineers. Britain immediately requested his
extradition. Again, Lee’s views were disregarded. Pickering recommended
extraditing Nash. Adams agreed that the United States had no jurisdiction
of crimes committed by foreigners on foreign vessels. In a brief note he
“advize[d] and requested” the federal judge before whom Nash had come to
hand him over to the British.170
Nash promptly began a habeas proceeding in which he made a lastminute claim that he was actually an American national, Jonathan Robbins,
who had been impressed onto the Hermione. While it lacked any evidentiary support, this charge succeeded in arousing popular sentiments on his
behalf.171 Impressments of American sailors were already a source of bitterness, and the idea that a kidnapped American who regained his liberty
through force should be returned to brutal British naval justice seemed an
outrage and a perversion.172 Judge Bee was openly skeptical of these claims
and saw them as tactics to arouse anti-extradition passions.173 While he suggested, again without explanation, that U.S. courts would have jurisdiction
over Nash,174 the bulk of the evidence and witnesses would be in British
hands, and Nash was rendered to them. Shortly thereafter he was summarily court-martialed in Jamaica, executed, and hung in chains.175
The treatment of Nash—now Robbins or Robins in the press—quickly
became a national scandal. Robbins became a martyr, and when Adams’s
letter to Bee became public, he became the villain in the drama. The event
169

The precise circumstances of the New Jersey proceeding, such as the nationalities of the defendants and the basis for jurisdiction, were obscure and would be a subject of much controversy in the
congressional debates. Supporters of Adams argued that the jury acquitted precisely because, “being
judges of law as well as fact,” they considered the prosecution a jurisdictional overreach. 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 592 (1800). Gallatin and other critics of the administration’s actions argued that the indictment
of the three showed there was no jurisdictional impediment to prosecuting Robbins in U.S. courts. Id. at
594.
170
See United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
171
See Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 323–35 (discussing how the issue of Robbins’s claim of citizenship was used by politicians to gain favor in the upcoming elections).
172
See id. at 353.
173
See id. at 299–302.
174
Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 832–33 (“There is no doubt that the circuit courts of the United States have
a concurrent jurisdiction, and this arises under the general law of nations; and if the 27th clause of the
treaty in question had not expressly declared the right to demand, and the obligation to deliver over, the
prisoner must have been tried here.”). As with Lee, Bee does not make clear whether U.S. courts would
have jurisdiction without the presence of a piracy charge.
175
Wedgwood, supra note 143, at 304. In the British proceedings, he confessed to being an Irishman. Id. at 304–05.
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prompted massive outrage that was partly the product of broader resentment
of the Adams administration and British high-handedness on the high
seas.176 The House promptly instituted proceedings to censure Adams for
his ex parte role in the matter.
3. Marshall’s Decisive Speech.—After days of debate, Marshall took
the floor. His long speech effectively ended the discussion and turned the
tide against censure. It immediately became famous and was widely reprinted.177 Courtroom arguments would cite the speech alongside judicial
precedents: “[T]hough delivered by a Congressman, [the speech] was to be
awarded constitutional place in the Appendix of Wheaton’s Supreme Court
opinions . . . .”178
Marshall’s remarks on the subject show how early he had formulated
his view and help flesh out the opinions he subsequently delivered from the
bench. In discussing the extent of American jurisdiction, he presented a
definite view of the Crimes Act. On the Court, he would not encounter a
case that posed this question until twenty years later—a case he decided
consistently with the views he first expressed on the House floor.
The jurisdictional arguments played a relatively small role in Robbins’s habeas case, and even less in the subsequent debate on the propriety
of the rendering. The major issues concerned the executive involvement in
the decision, the propriety of extraditing “Americans,” the legitimacy of
mutiny by impressed sailors, and the various inadequacies in the evidence
against Nash. Nonetheless, in the protracted and heated floor debate, Marshall’s able opponents had no response to his jurisdictional arguments.
Marshall devoted more attention to the jurisdictional argument than
any of the other speakers. He began by noting that the case obviously fell
within British jurisdiction; the only question was whether the United States
enjoyed concurrent power on the theory that “at sea all nations have a common jurisdiction.”179 He denied this position as a matter of international
law, citing treaties and the past practice of the United States in support:
It is not true that all nations have jurisdiction over all offences committed at
sea. On the contrary, no nation has any jurisdiction at sea, but over its own
citizens or vessels, or offences against itself.180

A contrary rule would have had absurd consequences. Could the
United States punish desertion by British seamen from a British to a French
vessel, or pickpocketing among British sailors? Such a general jurisdiction
176

See generally Wedgwood, supra note 143.
See id. at 355–57.
178
Id. at 234 n.3. Similarly, an earlier version of Marshall’s speech, published as a letter in a Virginia newspaper, was reprinted as an appendix to the report of the district court case. Robins, 27 F. Cas.
at 833.
179
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 598 (1800).
180
Id.
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over high seas offenses had never been suggested.181 Thus Marshall demonstrated that Lee’s broad statements proved too much. Without some limiting principle to distinguish murder from all other crimes, it would seem that
nations could either exercise complete jurisdiction over the entire conduct
of foreign vessels or none at all:
It follows, then, that no such common jurisdiction exists.
In truth the right of every nation to punish is limited, in its nature, to offences against the nation inflicting the punishment. This principle is believed
to be universally true.182

Any casual conflation of murder and robbery jurisdiction, Marshall explained, stems from neglecting the distinction between international and
statutory piracy:
[A]n offence which in its nature affects only a particular nation, is only punishable by that nation. It is by confounding general piracy with piracy by statute, that indistinct ideas have been produced, respecting the power to punish
offences committed on the high seas. A statute may make any offence piracy,
committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute, and such offence will be punishable by that nation. But piracy under the law of nations
. . . alone is punishable by all nations . . . . No particular nation can increase or
diminish the list of offences thus punishable.183

While U.S. courts could have jurisdiction over Nash’s piratical crime, they
could not prosecute him for murder. Of course, Marshall had to say something about the Crimes Act, which by its terms applied to murder on the
high seas “by any person” and was not limited to American vessels. Marshall forcefully replied that the Act did not and could apply on a universal
basis.
Congress could not have wanted to sweep in foreign causes. But even
if it did, it could not: “Any general expression in a legislative act must, necessarily, be restrained to objects within the jurisdiction of the legislature
passing the act.”184 He then turned to the statute for further evidence of its
limited application. He first looked to the title, which spoke of “crimes
against the United States.” Then he looked at the variety of statutory piracies to which the “any person” language equally applied. They included
misprision of treason, running away with a vessel, and striking an officer.
But surely the United States could not punish misprision of treason by a
Frenchman against France; nor could it punish a French capture of a British
ship, though this might involve both striking an officer and running away
181

Id. at 599 (“A common jurisdiction over all offences at sea, in whatever vessel committed,
would involve the power of punishing the offences which have been stated. Yet, all gentlemen will disclaim this power.”).
182
Id. at 599–600.
183
Robins, 27 F. Cas. at 862.
184
Id. at 863.
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with a vessel.185 In other words, as even the opposition had conceded, such
offenses were outside U.S. jurisdiction,186 and the words “any person” were
either intended to be limited or required limitation throughout the statute. A
literal reading could not be sustained throughout the statute because, despite
the moral appeal of universal jurisdiction for murder, the jurisdictional distinction between piracies and felonies had to be maintained, even against
Congress’s will.187
Thus far, Marshall’s argument against universal jurisdiction beyond piracy rested solely on international and general law grounds.188 Yet at the
end of the discussion, Marshall made it exceedingly clear that this limitation was embedded in the Define and Punish Clause itself. While the limitation may have begun in the law of nations, it was cemented by the
framing of the Constitution, which gave Congress only limited powers,
amongst which universal jurisdiction was not one:
[The Define and Punish] clause can never be construed to make to the Government a grant of power, which the people making it do not themselves possess. It has already been shown that the people of the United States have no
jurisdiction over offences committed on board a foreign ship against a foreign
nation. Of consequence, in framing a Government for themselves, they cannot
have passed this jurisdiction to that Government. The law [the Crimes Act],
therefore, cannot act upon the case. But this clause of the Constitution cannot
be considered, and need not be considered, as affecting acts which are piracy
under the law of nations.189

Because Robbins was extradited, the question of jurisdiction escaped
the courts. It would take another twenty years before a prosecution would
proceed against a foreigner for a murder on a foreign vessel. Marshall
would repeat, perhaps less lucidly, his arguments about the statute’s title
and the inapplicability of universal jurisdiction to statutory “piracies.” Yet
the opinion in that case seems crabbed, almost as if it were referring back to
some longer exposition of the idea. That exposition, it turns out, was his
celebrated House address. This gives valuable context to the subsequent
opinions, which were sketchy on the source of the jurisdictional limitation.
The House speech was an extraordinary success and attracted great attention. It was “said by Judge Story to be among the very ablest arguments
on record, and . . . [it] temporarily silenced opposition.”190 It had the immediate effect of saving Adams from censure. A few months later, Adams
chose Marshall to replace Pickering and then shortly thereafter elevated him
to the Court.
185
186
187
188
189
190
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C. The Crimes Act in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has only dealt with the scope of Congress’s authority to criminalize universally in a few cases decided within a few weeks of
each other. It concluded that Congress’s power to define and punish entirely foreign conduct only applied to piratical offenses.
In the 1810s, numerous Latin American colonies had revolted against
Spain. With the collapse of governmental authority, a variety of fly-bynight insurgent republics freely issued letters of marque of dubious validity
to shady characters in order to field some naval force against Spanish shipping. These “privateers” were often indiscriminate in their targets and,
along with open pirates encouraged by the anarchy, significantly disrupted
American commerce. These privateers usually had some American connection—either sailing from Baltimore or having Americans among the crew—
but this connection would often be difficult to prove after a long and circuitous voyage.
1. United States v. Palmer.—Palmer involved classic international
law piracy—the armed robbery of a Spanish vessel.191 Some of the defendants were American, some not, and their original ship was apparently foreign. With respect to the foreign defendants, this would be the perfect case
for universal jurisdiction. The 1790 piracy statute applied by its terms to
“any persons.” Marshall began his discussion by squarely holding that the
Define and Punish Clause allows Congress to deal with pirates “although
they may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offence
against the United States.”192 The Constitution thus entitled Congress to
deal with the one universal jurisdiction crime on a universal jurisdiction basis.
Yet despite the constitutionality and international legality of such jurisdiction, Marshall held that the statute’s general language was not intended to reach even robbery on the high seas—general piracy—unless it
had a U.S. nexus. Marshall suggested at least two reasons for such a narrow and seemingly artificial interpretation—both lines of thought that he
had previously expressed in Congress during the Robbins affair. First,
Marshall considered the title of the statute—“An Act for the Punishment of
certain Crimes against the United States.” He concluded that Congress
could not have put under such a heading “offences against the human
race.”193 But the statute in question was simply the complete criminal code
of the United States; the piracy provisions were just a few among its thirtytwo separate sections, punishing a variety of common crimes committed in
federal enclaves. The title might capture the overarching purpose of the
provisions as a whole. It is less obvious that the title, adopted without de191
192
193

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 611 (1818).
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
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liberation, should by itself limit particular terms to less than their plain
meaning. As the title is not an operative provision, a conflict between it
and the plain language of the statute could arguably go to the latter.
More compelling is Marshall’s second argument.194 Section 8 lists a
variety of offenses as piracy, starting with the classic “robbery on the high
seas,” but extending also to captains making off with their vessels and even
sailors assaulting their commanders. The latter two offenses were not piracy according to the law of nations, and thus not universally cognizable.195
Marshall suggested that Congress could not have intended the Act to apply
to such crimes. Yet this conclusion flies in the face of the text: the “all persons” phrase refers to all crimes in section 8. Thus if “all persons” means
universal jurisdiction for robbery, it would also mean universal jurisdiction
for the other crimes, which “are offences against the nation under whose
flag the vessel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on board
the vessel are. . . . [A]nd no general words of a statute ought to be construed
to embrace them when committed by foreigners against a foreign government.”196 Because “any persons” would lead to absurd results if taken literally with regard to most of the listed offenses, it would have to take a
nonliteral meaning with regard to piracy itself.
Marshall never directly addressed the question of whether Congress
had constitutional authority to apply the various provisions of section 8 universally. Instead, he merely held that Congress could not have intended to
do so in the Crimes Act. Congress had no discernible interest in regulating
revolts by foreign seamen on a foreign vessel. So statutory language notwithstanding, it presumably did not try to extend its jurisdiction to such
purely foreign causes,197 and this must mean that “any persons” means less
than “any.”
Still, Marshall’s analysis borrowed heavily from his argument about
Jonathan Robbins twenty years earlier, though in somewhat abbreviated
form.198 It seems safe to conclude from his reiteration of the same arguments and examples that the holding of Palmer was guided by his earlier
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Id. at 631–33.
See Story, supra note 139, at 2–3.
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Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 632–33.
197
Id. at 631–32. The example recalls the Robins case.
198
Indeed, Palmer may allude directly to the speech. After giving various examples of how reading
the Act’s broad language to allow for universal jurisdiction would produce absurd results, Marshall concludes that the point “might be still farther illustrated by animadversions on other sections of the Act.”
Id. at 633. Of course, in his Robbins speech, he did draw examples from other sections of the Act, like
section 6. See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 603 (1800). Given the wide circulation of the speech, this may be
why Marshall thought a recitation of all the examples would be “tedious” and “unnecessary.” Palmer,
16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 633.
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view that the Define and Punish Clause did not allow Congress to extend
the jurisdictional status of piracy to municipal felonies.199
One must appreciate how nonobvious and perhaps strained Marshall’s
statutory construction was. It was clear to most observers that Congress
had intended to punish piracy to the full extent sovereign nations punish
it—universally.200 Indeed, the statute had in prior cases been used to hang
foreign pirates for crimes committed on foreign vessels.201 There was no
evidence that Congress had wanted to depart from the general practice of
nations in this regard. Rather, it had simply written an ungainly statute that
inadvertently extended piracy jurisdiction to other crimes as well.202
The strain Marshall’s reading placed on the text and legislative intent
drew extraordinarily sharp words from John Quincy Adams:
[The Court’s] reasoning is a sample of judicial logic—disingenuous, false, and
hollow . . . . [I]f human language means anything, Congress had made general
piracy, by whomsoevever and wheresoever . . . cognizable by the Circuit
Court.203

The inability to prosecute pirates universally was an “enormous hole in the
moral garment of this nation made by this desperate thrust of the Supreme
Court.”204
Marshall recognized that his reading of the statute was difficult. Any
consistent reading of “any person” would frustrate one of Congress’s intentions. Marshall did not adopt the broader reading, even though it had more
support in the text. His interpretation is an evident attempt to find a limiting construction. The textual difficulty and policy embarrassment created
by the opinion show that there must have been a significant countervailing
value that required Marshall’s “captious subtleties.”205
Indeed, Justice Johnson and the U.S. Attorney, who naturally argued
for broad U.S. jurisdiction, thought that the Constitution itself imposed a
limit on the reach of Congress’s jurisdiction over anything but piracy.
Blake, the prosecutor, conceded that “all persons” could be taken literally as
applied to the latter crimes in section 8. He suggested splitting the difference, reading “all persons” literally as applied to robbery, but reading it
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In explaining Palmer to a grand jury the next year, Justice Story reaffirmed that, according to the
law of nations, only the piracy provision of the criminal statute could apply universally. See Story, supra note 139 (“[N]o nation can have any right by its own legislation to bind the subjects of foreign governments as to offences which fall within the exclusive cognizance of such government.”).
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See 4 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363 (Charles Francis Adams
ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875).
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See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
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Marshall’s way with respect to the other crimes.206 What this lacked in elegance it would make up for in fidelity to Congress’s intent. Moreover, he
argued, the Constitution “conferred” upon Congress the power and “duty”
to punish “real” piracy regardless of nexus.207 It did not, he agreed, give
them such power over “[a] felony, which is made a piracy by municipal
statutes.”208 Finally, Justice Johnson’s separate opinion209 apparently referred to limitations inherent in the Define and Punish power.210 He argued
that Congress is entirely disabled from exercising universal jurisdiction beyond what was permitted by international law; because international law
was regarded as a presumptive but not absolute bar to contrary legislation,
Johnson’s statement suggests that he regarded the obstacle as constitutional.
2. United States v. Klintock211.—Congress responded immediately to
Palmer by passing a supplemental law clearly establishing universal jurisdiction over sea robbery.212 The clarifying statute expired at the end of the
next year. Remarkably, legislation to extend the 1819 Act failed to do so
because of the latter measure’s own inarticulate draftsmanship.213 In the
end, the language of the 1790 Act remained the governing law, despite two
attempts by Congress to make piracy universally cognizable.214
Against this background the Court heard the case of Ralph Klintock.
The defendant was an American captain of a privateer in the service of an
unrecognized Latin American rebel leader who had piratically attacked a
Danish ship.215 The case fell squarely within the purposes of Congress’s
206

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 617–618 (1818) (Argument of Mr. Blake for
the United States).
207
Id. at 620.
208
Id. (emphasis added).
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He wrote separately to differ on certain other points and to criticize Marshall for discussing issues not raised by the case. Id. at 636–37, 641 (Johnson, J.).
210
Id. at 641–42 (“Congress can inflict punishment on offences committed on board the vessels of
the United States, or by citizens of the United States, any where; but congress cannot make that piracy
which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences.” (emphasis added)). But see KENT, supra note 123, at 175 (“This decision [in Palmer] was according to the law and practice of nations . . . .”). Kent’s discussion of Congress’s constitutional
authority under Clause Ten is not clearly separate from his views on its authority under international
law. Id. at 172–74.
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18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
212
Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819) (clarifying intent to assert universal jurisdiction over piracy through language stating “[t]hat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall,
on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations . . . .” (emphasis added)).
See generally United States v. Chapels, 25 F. Cas. 399 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 14,782) (discussing
background to the 1819 Act).
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Define and Punish power—bringing Americans to justice for offenses
against foreign countries. Yet for no readily apparent reason, the Certificate
in Palmer had described jurisdiction as entirely depending on the nationality of the vessel.216 Klintock’s lawyer seized on this to argue that Palmer
controlled the case and thus prevented any jurisdiction over foreign vessels.
And while it was clear from the 1819 amendment that Congress wished to
reach purely foreign piracy, the conduct had occurred in 1818.217
The Chief Justice found a way to sustain jurisdiction without explicitly
overruling Palmer. While Palmer precluded punishing piracy on foreign
vessels, it did not address the question of a vessel having no nationality—
that is, of a ship “in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and
acknowledging obedience to no government whatever.”218 This description
happens to fit pirates to a tee, because they “renounced all the benefits of
society and government.”219 Thus the statelessness fiction allowed Marshall
to get the best of both worlds, applying the Crimes Act to piracies against
foreign vessels without universalizing other crimes. If Congress can punish
piracy by any piratical vessel, then the mischief done by Palmer would be
largely remedied simply by calling pirate ships “stateless.” The Court had
to vindicate this power through the indirect route of “statelessness” because
of the odd combination of artless drafting in 1790, the gloss put on those
words by Palmer, and more artless drafting in 1819.
3. United States v. Furlong220.—Furlong involved multiple cases
against multiple sets of defendants, certified from various circuit courts and
decided together.221 The crew of the privateer Louisa, apparently an American-owned vessel in the service of the self-styled “Republic of Bueneos
Aryes,” forcibly seized their vessel and began a piratical cruise. Along the
way, they attacked both American and foreign vessels. While most of the
pirate crew was American, Furlong was an Irish national. Apart from various crimes committed against American vessels, he was charged with robbery and murder aboard an English ship.222
216
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Again, Marshall’s original construction of the original Crimes Act in
Palmer would leave Furlong’s crimes against the English vessel beyond the
Court’s reach, despite Congress’s clear competence under the Constitution
and international law to punish it. Furthermore, the Act of 1819 had shown
that Congress desired to extend universal jurisdiction to classic piracy and
probably had the same intention in the prior measure. Thus, Justice Johnson, writing for the Court, invoked the Klintock fiction of statelessness—the
idea that piratical vessels lose the privileges of national protection—to
backtrack from Palmer’s difficult conclusion that piracy could not be punished on a universal basis. The Court held in Furlong that a murder in
which someone on a “stateless” vessel shot someone on a foreign vessel
could be punished.223
Recognizing the confusion caused by the statelessness fiction, the
Court turned to Furlong’s final crime, a murder of a foreigner on a nonpiratical foreign vessel. Here, the Court laid down some clear lines. An “offence committed by a foreigner upon a foreigner in a foreign ship” is a
matter in which Congress “ha[s] no right to interfere.”224 Such a case would
go beyond the scope of “the punishing powers of the body that enacted
it.”225 The Court distinguished between piracies at international law and
other crimes. Only the former, when committed among foreigners, fell
“within the acknowledged reach of the punishing powers of Congress.”226
This language seems to refer directly to Clause Ten, and the distinction between piracy and murder precisely tracks Clause Ten’s “Piracies and Felonies” distinction:
There exist well-known distinctions between the crimes of piracy and
murder, both as to constituents and incidents. Robbery on the seas is
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. . . . Not so with the crime of murder. It is an offence too abhorrent to the feelings of man, to have made it necessary that it also should
have been brought within this universal jurisdiction. And hence, punishing it when committed within the jurisdiction, or, (what is the same
thing,) in the vessel of another nation, has not been acknowledged as a
right.227
By this reasoning, the test of what Congress can make universally cognizable is the law of nations. Congress cannot expand its jurisdiction by calling
crimes “piracies” when they do not have such a status in international law.
Piracy and murder “are things so essentially different in their nature, that
not even the omnipotence of legislative power can confound or identify
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them.”228 It would be harder to find clearer language expressing the view
that this limit is inherent and nonderogable.229
There are two parts to the Court’s opinion: one formal and the other
structural. First, Congress has power over piracies; that power can thus be
exercised only consistent with its “well-known . . . constituents and incidents.”230 Thus, presumably this special jurisdictional reach only extends to
piracy and not to other crimes that Congress is authorized to punish. Treating as identical things known to be different would simply be an “absurdity.”231 The second argument is a reductio ad absurdum. If Congress can
punish anything universally by calling it piracy, “what offence might not be
brought within their power by the same device?”232 The notion that Congress could generally legislate as to crimes on foreign vessels was selfevidently impossible. This hearkened back to Marshall’s argument in the
Robbins matter.
4. United States v. Holmes.—Furlong’s dictum that Congress could
reach murder on a stateless vessel was confirmed a few weeks later in the
case of Holmes, involving a murder committed by a pirate crew onboard a
vessel they had seized.233 The defendants were of mixed nationalities, and
the nationality of the victim was unclear. Justice Washington, in an exceedingly terse opinion, held that what Klintock had said about robbery on stateless vessels would be true of murder as well. In particular, the murder of a
foreigner by foreigners would be cognizable upon a “piratical” ship, but not
upon a foreign one.234 But Furlong had stressed that murder and robbery
are quite different. The statelessness device in Klintock merely gave Congress universal jurisdiction over sea robbery, which it possessed in international law.
Holmes seems to use the statelessness device to expand Congress’s
reach beyond what had been previously allowed. However, on its facts, it
would be hard to say that Holmes lay outside traditional U.S. jurisdiction,
and the entire universality discussion may have been unnecessary. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggested that the pirate vessels were American;
the identity of the captured ship and murdered person also remain obscure,
but the victim too may well have been an American.235
As a result of the scanty facts and reasoning, it is hard to know what to
make of the Klintock and Holmes cases. The Court may have taken the
view, perhaps held by Lee and Iredell, that murder on the high seas was
228
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universally cognizable under international law. However, this would make
the cases hard to square with Furlong and Palmer, both of which seem to
reject this view. Klintock and Holmes may represent a rather narrow exception to the requirement of a U.S. nexus, if they represent an exception at all.
They may be about evidentiary rather than jurisdictional principles. If U.S.
jurisdiction does not extend to purely foreign crimes, what happens in a
case where one simply cannot tell if the locus or victim was American or
foreign? Indeed, the Court explicitly explained its decision in Holmes as
merely putting the burden of proof regarding foreign status on the defendants.236
Alternatively, if the ship were not American, Holmes could be an example of supplemental or pendent universal jurisdiction. A vessel only becomes stateless when it engages in piracy. That offense clearly falls within
Congress’s Piracies power. At the same time, pirates are quite likely to
commit murder, and given that the United States has jurisdiction over much
of their conduct already, prosecuting the murder as well might not be seen
as the establishment of a separate jurisdiction. As piracy must be proven
first, the jurisdiction over murder will generally be a moot question, given
that a piracy conviction would promptly be fatal for the defendant.237
Moreover, the cases could be understood as being examples of “pendent
party” jurisdiction, given that some defendants were clearly American.
This would be consistent with the treatment of the Hermione mutineers
tried in Trenton.238
D. Summary
Taken together, these cases show that Congress can only apply its universal jurisdiction to piracy, which was universally cognizable under the
law of nations.239 Allowing universal jurisdiction for simple felonies would
236
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expand the piracy power and blur the distinctions between the two categories. In Palmer and Furlong, the Court distinguished between Congress’s
power with regard to piracy and other crimes. Palmer shows Marshall’s
doubts about the nonrobbery provisions of the Crimes Act to have remained
unchanged since he first expressed them in 1799, when he said a literal
reading of the law would exceed Congress’s Define and Punish powers.
Furlong held even more emphatically that Congress could not “extend the
punishment for murder to the case of that offence committed by a foreigner
upon a foreigner in a foreign ship.”240 Justice Johnson in both cases explained that Congress’s power to define had to have some correspondence
to objective external definitions; Congress could not by fiat give the jurisdictional status of piracy to an offense, like murder, that while universally
condemned, was not subject to universal jurisdiction under international
law. A minority of jurists like Justice Iredell thought murder on the high
seas was universally cognizable, though there was no support for this view
in state practice. This suggests that using the universal jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution requires more than a mere claim that an offense is
universally cognizable in international law.
The intermediate case of vessels without nationality has little bearing
on the constitutional question. The Court’s statelessness rulings appear to
be an end-run around earlier statutory interpretations, or at most, an extension of piracy’s universal jurisdiction to other crimes arising out of the
same “common nucleus of operative fact.”241 Statelessness was piracy by
another name. The set of stateless vessels—those having cast off claims of
national protection—that the Court dealt with was largely if not entirely
congruent with the set of piratical vessels.242 Thus, even after these decisions, Congress could not declare non-American vessels stateless for the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over nonpiratical or nonuniversal crimes.
Indeed, subsequent courts saw Palmer as reading the statute in light of
constitutional principles and did not understand Holmes to change these
principles, even with regard to murder. One court, in discussing the Crimes
Act, observed that “[i]n but few of its provisions can it be taken literally”
because “this would lead us to the punishment of murders committed on
rivers in the heart of foreign countries by their own citizens or subjects.”243
Such an outcome would be simply “absurd” because it exceeds the “jurisdiction of the United States.”244
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V. THE SLAVE TRADE
A. The Constitution in Congress
A ban on the importation of slaves in America went into effect in 1808,
the earliest date permitted by the Constitution.245 Beginning in 1807, Congress took increasingly severe measures against the trade. Bills against it
enjoyed broad support. This came from an increased awareness of the cruelty with which the trade was carried on, even among those who did not desire abolition per se, as well as a robust “Baptists and bootleggers” coalition
of Northern abolitionists and Southern slave owners not wanting to see the
prices of their “property” undercut. At the same time, European powers,
though slower to legislate against it, had begun to denounce the trade.
In 1820 Congress went further than it or any other nation had ever
gone before by declaring the slave trade a form of piracy punishable by
death.246 The statute applied to “any citizen of the United States” engaged
in the slave trade on any vessel, or “any person whatever” engaged in the
slave trade on a ship “owned in the whole or part . . . [by] any citizen or
citizens of the United States.”247 Thus, while slavery had been dubbed piratical, Congress could only punish it to the extent that it had a demonstrable U.S. nexus.248 In other words, Congress extended jurisdiction almost to
the point of universal jurisdiction—but not further.
The goal of the statute was two-fold. First, it increased the penalties
for importation into the United States. Second, Congress had come to see
the trade as an unmitigated evil, and American involvement in the trade hurt
the “honor of the nation.”249 Thus, the statute also punished Americans trafficking slaves from Africa to other countries. Congress wanted to end the
slave trade globally, out of humanitarian concerns, as the subsequent diplomatic and ultimately military history bears out. The report of the House
Committee explained:
In proposing . . . to make such part of this offense as occurs upon the ocean,
piracy, your committee are animated, not by the desire of manifesting to the
world the horror with which it is viewed by the American people; but, by the
245
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confident expectation of promising, by this example, its more certain punishment by all nations, and its absolute and final extinction.250

While the statute designated it as piracy, slave trading was clearly not a violation of international law at the time. It had not been recognized as universally cognizable, though several major maritime nations had banned it.251
So in 1823 the House adopted, by a 131-9 majority and with the support of
President Monroe, a resolution requesting the President
to enter upon and prosecute . . . such negotiations with the several maritime
powers . . . for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation as piracy, under the law of nations, by the consent of the
civilized world.252

Congress dubbed slavery as piracy precisely to catalyze a progressive development in the law of nations, but understood that this development could
take decades to mature. It was understood that without the general assent of
nations, slave trading could be called piracy but could not take on its jurisdictional aspects.253 The next year, in negotiating an anti-slaving convention with Britain, Monroe made it an “indispensable condition” that
Parliament label the trade as piracy.254
Congress wanted to legislate against the trade as far is it could. Indeed,
to the extent that the goal was to abolish the global trade, a jurisdictionally
limited law would ensure unusually severe punishments to fellow Americans, while simply shifting business to the fleets of other less scrupulous
nations. To those who saw the death penalty as a steep but proper price to
pay for the suppression of the trade, such a consequence would be hard on
Americans without accomplishing the global goal.
International law had not yet made the trade universally cognizable and
thus a broader and perhaps more effective jurisdiction was impossible. Despite its strong desire to do so, Congress felt that it could not legislate on a
purely universal basis unless the offense had truly acquired the status of piracy through the practice of nations. The report on the bill from the House
Committee on the Slave Trade demonstrates that this limitation was not
seen as one deriving from international law in proprio vigore, but rather
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from the enumerated powers in Article I.255 Charles Fenton Mercer of Virginia, the head of the committee and an indefatigable crusader against the
slave trade, discussed the objection that the 1820 law could only effect a
“partial” end to the slave trade. His report replied that “the Constitutional
power of the Government has already been exercised in defining the crime
of piracy” as far as it could, given that the slave trade had yet to become
universally cognizable.256 It continued:
Such is the unavoidable consequence of any exercise of the authority of Congress, to define and punish this crime. The definition and punishment can bind
the United States alone.257

This view was apparently supported by the Administration, which noted
that the United States dubbed the slave trade piracy only “in relation to
themselves,” because “they are bound, by the injunctions of their constitution to execute it, [only] so far as it respects the punishment of their own
citizens . . . .”258 Congress’s failure to extend universal jurisdiction to slave
trading is significant evidence of how it understood the constitutional limits
on its Clause Ten powers. Congress obviously desired to treat the offense
on a universal basis, and therefore the refusal to do so can be taken with the
seriousness of a statement against interest.
Congress understood that simply calling an offense “piracy” could not
give it the jurisdictional reach it had over piracy as defined by international
law. It sought to eventually establish the trade as a violation of international law; already many nations had banned or condemned it.259 But in the
meantime, Congress did not think it could exercise universal jurisdiction
under the “Offenses” provision either, because the prohibition had not been
firmly established in the law of nations. In short, only if the conduct were a
universally cognizable offense in international law did the committee feel it
could cast a universal net. Such legislative restraint, exercised by men who
had seen the Constitution adopted in their lifetime, may be the best evidence available as to the clause’s scope.
However, even dubbing the trade “piracy” without punishing it universally raised some questions about the scope of the Define and Punish
power. Some congressmen objected that piracy was an offense with welldefined elements; the slave trade was just a different offense. Thus, the latter could not be made equivalent to the former.260 This argument may be
255
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disingenuous, a rhetorical sally by a minority of Southern legislators fearful
of any restrictions on the slave industry.261 On its merits, the objection is
silly. Just because Congress called the offense piracy in the statute does not
mean it used its Piracies power: it did not make the slave trade universally
cognizable, and thus did not actually treat it like piracy. The 1820 Act was
an exercise of the Felonies power. It is hard to imagine that the Constitution restricts the names that Congress can attach to offenses.
B. The Antelope
The Antelope began with the seizure of Spanish and Portuguese slave
ships by American warships.262 Spain and Portugal sued in federal court for
the restoration of the slaves, while the U.S. government sought to free them.
The libellants argued that the United States could not liberate the slaves
both because the trade did not violate international law and because such a
seizure was not authorized by U.S. law. Congressman Charles Ingersoll,
appearing on behalf of the Iberian states, made the constitutional argument
explicit. Noting that Congress had not extended the Act of 1820 to foreigners on foreign vessels, he suggested that such an extension, if made, would
exceed its constitutional powers.263 This of course was precisely what his
colleague in the House, Representative Mercer, had said at the time.264
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled for the libellants, but his discussion did not clearly disentangle the international and
constitutional strands. Marshall’s opinion rested primarily on international
law and general principles, which apply directly in maritime cases. As
precedent, he primarily cited a recent British admiralty decision, Le Louis,
involving similar facts. In the opinion, it was not clear whether the prohibition on universal jurisdiction came solely from international law or from the
Constitution. While admitting the evil of the slave trade, he held that a prohibitory norm had not won the consent of all civilized nations.265 In particular, because slave trading had not become piracy in international law:
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It can be made so only by statute; and the obligation of the statute cannot transcend the legislative power of the state which may enact it.
If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is almost superfluous to say in this Court, that the right of bringing in for adjudication in
time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a nation which has prohibited
the trade, cannot exist.266

The reference to “the legislative power” could be understood as referring to Congress’s enumerated powers,267 but could also refer to the prescriptive jurisdiction of states in international law. But it is certain that, in
the vigorously argued and much publicized case, no one contradicted Ingersoll’s view that if the slave trade was not universally cognizable in international law, Congress lacked the constitutional power to punish it.
CONCLUSION
Neither the “Felonies” nor the “Offenses against the Law of Nations”
powers give Congress a blank check for universal jurisdiction legislation.
They may allow universal jurisdiction over piracy alone, or at most, over
offenses currently treated as universal by the law of nations. This conclusion is supported by the rulings of the Supreme Court in the few cases addressing the question, the elaborately expressed argument of John Marshall,
the self-restraint of Congress in the criminalization of the slave trade, and
numerous statements by leading jurists of the early Republic. Only two
figures—Iredell and Lee—thought that universal jurisdiction could extend
to other atrocious crimes on the high seas. Set against those two are Wilson, Marshall, Story, John Quincy Adams, St. George Tucker, and others.
Certainly Marshall’s and Story’s views bear particular weight here, not only
because of their stature in constitutional interpretation, but also because one
cannot suspect them of hostility to sweeping interpretations of federal
power. Furthermore, Iredell’s and Lee’s views can be understood as disagreements about what crimes were universally cognizable in international
law or the acceptability of pendent universal jurisdiction. In any event,
Marshall’s logic prevailed in Congress in 1799 and—due to his position on
the Court—thereafter. There are no echoes of Iredell’s view in any judicial
decision or in the period after 1800 generally. In the absence of explicit
discussion of the clause’s jurisdictional scope in the drafting or ratification
process, the support for Marshall’s position seems overwhelming.
What this means for the scope of universal jurisdiction under Clause
Ten today depends on how one thinks terms in the Constitution that refer to
international law should be understood when international law changes
greatly over time. First, does the mention of piracy make it the only univer266
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sal jurisdiction offense Congress can ever create, or does it allow Congress
to punish whatever the international law of the time makes universally punishable, and thus treats as a piracy? Because Clause Ten specifically names
piracy, rather than referring to the concept of universal jurisdiction, a pure
textualist or original meaning view would limit application of such jurisdiction under Clause Ten exclusively to piracy. To be sure, the Framers recognized that the law of nations could change over time. But this cuts both
ways. If the expansion of universal jurisdiction to other crimes could be anticipated, the singling out of piracy could suggest a choice to limit universal
jurisdiction to that crime. Such a result would not lead to absurd consequences. For one, Congress could still use treaties to achieve universal jurisdiction or something close to it; almost all legislation providing for
universal jurisdiction has been enacted pursuant to recently signed multilateral conventions.268 Furthermore, universal jurisdiction is so rarely used by
nations that such a jurisdictional limitation could hardly be thought of as a
significant disability.
A broader view of Clause Ten would see it as limiting universal jurisdiction to those crimes that in the law of nations take on the then-unique jurisdictional character of piracy. In other words, “Piracies” need not lock the
Constitution into the law of nations circa 1789. This would doom the Constitution to awkward anachronism, given that customary doctrines are
meant to be organic. Updating “Piracies” would include offenses that today’s law of nations treats as universally cognizable, such as genocide and
crimes against humanity.269 More generally, because this position takes the
international law of the present day as its standard, it would allow punishment of Clause Ten crimes to track expanding international notions of jurisdiction. Today’s international rules of jurisdiction are considerably less
formalistic and more effects-based than those of the eighteenth century.
Thus, if international law has come to recognize a flexible territorial-effects
jurisdiction or passive personality jurisdiction—which were unknown at the
time of the Framing—that would define the new limit on Congress’s power
over high seas felonies and crimes against the law of nations.
Some evidence from the early Republic supports the evolutionary understanding of international law terms. In enacting the 1820 law designating the slave trade as piracy, Congress thought that universal jurisdiction
could not apply because it had not yet become a universal jurisdiction offense in international law. However, Congress and the Administration assumed that the United States could punish it universally after it got added to
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the international list of universal jurisdiction crimes.270 In 1822 and 1823
the House passed resolutions calling for the President to work towards obtaining the agreement of other nations to treat the trade as piracy. The implicit premise was that Congress could then punish it as a Clause Ten
piracy.271 This suggests a broadly shared understanding that piracy itself is
not the only possible “piracy” for Define and Punish Clause purposes.272
One aspect of the debate muddies the lessons that can be learned from
this episode. When it was urged that the slave trade could not be made
equivalent to piracy by statute because it was not piracy by definition, the
supporters of the statute responded that the slave trade did fit within the established international law definition of piracy. It involved robbery—the
stealing of people—committed on the high seas.273 This response could be
read to suggest that the statute’s supporters were not fully confident that the
piracy power extended beyond classical piracy. But it was more likely a
quick rejoinder to silence the critics, while still emphasizing the savagery of
the slave trade. Because the statute purposefully did not make it universally
recognizable, the criticism was weak and rejoinder unnecessary.
Colonel Mercer made a highly positivist argument that piracy can be
whatever international law says it is: “The law of nations is in part natural;
in part conventional. Its only sanction is to be found in the physical force,
its legal authority in the . . . consent of nations. The consent of nations may
make piracy of any offence upon the high seas.”274 The Monroe Admini270

See 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2210 (1820) (noting that punishment of the slave trade as piracy
would, “for a time at least,” be confined to U.S. citizens, and suggesting that once the offense became
universally cognizable, it could be punished more broadly).
271
40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1149–50 (1823) (“Let the African slave trade be denounced to be piracy
under the law of nations by the consent of the maritime powers of Europe and America, and . . . [a]ll nations will have authority to detect, to punish it, to hunt it down.”); Letter from John Quincy Adams to
Stratford Canning, supra note 258 (suggesting that the United States would be able to treat the slave
trade as piracy when it attains such status in international law); Letter from John Quincy Adams to
Richard Rush (June 24, 1823), in 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 3020 (1824) (“The resolution . . . recommends
negotiation, to obtain the consent of the civilized world to recognise it as piracy, under the law of nations. One of the properties of that description of piracies is, that those who are guilty of it may be . . .
tried by the courts of every nation.”); Letter from A.H. Everett to Baron de Nagell (Nov. 7, 1823), in 42
ANNALS OF CONG. 3035 (1824) (making clear the U.S. desire to punish the offense universally when it
achieved such status in international law).
272
The efforts to establish universal jurisdiction over the slave trade, and their relation to British
proposals to establish international courts for the offense, are discussed further in Eugene Kontorovich,
The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave Trade Tribunals
(Northwestern Pub. Law Research Paper No. 09-06, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1340645.
273
See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1150 (1823) (“And is it not robbery to seize, not the property of the
man, but the man himself . . . ?”); 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2209 (1820) (“Are [piracy and the slave trade]
not united in this offence all that is most iniquitous in theft, most daring in robbery, and cruel in murder?”); see also Letter from A.H. Everett to Baron de Nagell, supra note 271, at 3034 (“In fact, this pretend commerce bears all the characteristics of piracy . . . .”).
274
40 ANNALS OF CONG. 1150 (1823).
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stration, which in 1823 petitioned other nations to agree to making the trade
piracy, also seemed to think that the United States would then be able to
punish it.275 On the whole, most seemed to think it possible to use the Constitution’s Piracies power against new international crimes on the high
seas.276
On the other hand, much constitutional tradition counsels against updating the content of “Piracies.” Many constitutional concepts lock in the
common law at the time of the Founding. The question of when one gets a
jury turns largely on eighteenth-century distinctions between law and equity
that have long been abandoned in modern procedure.277 Habeas jurisprudence sees the Constitution as implicitly locking in the writ as it existed in
the eighteenth century, even though one might imagine the common law
evolving to change, and reduce, the availability of habeas. Instead, habeas
with all its anachronisms—such as the requirement of, and limitation to,
cases of confinement—is by and large maintained. Similarly, while the
common law of nations in 1789 recognized broad sovereign immunity, one
can imagine this changing over time. Indeed, today states enjoy broader
immunity in certain respects than do foreign nations because the former’s
immunity is locked in the often difficult to determine 1791 law, while the
latter remains extra-constitutional common law, and thus subject to judicial
and legislative limitation.278
A final “updating” question relates to the standard for determining
whether an offense has become universally cognizable. The traditional
definition of customary international law required clear, repeated, and near
universal state practice to establish a norm. This standard may be higher
than one under which offenses are dubbed “universal” in contemporary
scholarship and some jurisprudence. Today, norms are often proclaimed as
universal jurisdiction without broad state practice; proclamations and resolutions are used in place of longstanding national conduct.279 Here, the
slave trade example cuts against updating. At the time, the slave trade was
widely condemned by European nations through nonbinding proclamations.280 Thus there is nothing new about “soft law.” Yet Mercer’s report
275

See 42 ANNALS OF CONG. 3027–35 (1824).
Because Congress never did extend universal jurisdiction to the slave trade, this precedent is
suggestive but hardly conclusive.
277
See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
278
Compare Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Sch. Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (holding that states retain sovereign immunity when participating in the market in commercial
activity), with Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2006) (eliminating the immunity of foreign nations to suits “based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state”).
279
See, e.g., Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding torture to be universally
cognizable on grounds that all states condemned it, despite massive state practice to the contrary).
280
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Great Britain, Austria, France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, and
Sweden all denounced the slave trade in strong terms. Most of those nations, as well as Holland and the
United States, had also begun banning the trade in various degrees, with several nations forbidding it
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takes the position that Congress could only treat as a piracy conduct that nations universally treated as within universal jurisdiction.
Indeed, the degree of international consensus as to universal jurisdiction over piracy was complete, long-standing, and realized in practice. To
be even roughly analogous, a modern international law crime should correspond on those dimensions. Yet the constitutional nature of the distinction
between “Piracies” and other crimes suggests that it should take real state
practice to render an act piracy. If the Supreme Court’s piracy cases stand
for anything, it is that Congress cannot grant itself universal jurisdiction by
calling an act piracy when such an act does not objectively enjoy such a
status in international law. Obviously the freedom to call something universally cognizable based on soft law makes it easier for Congress to make
“Offenses” into “Piracies.” Indeed, Furlong’s rejection of murder as piracy
suggests that the Define and Punish clause requires more than just universal
condemnation for universal jurisdiction.
*

*

*

Taking together the treaty power and a broad evolutionary view of “Piracies,” Congress could reach most of what it would likely want to punish
through universal jurisdiction. Yet even here there are limits, such as when
Congress tries to reach matters clearly of lesser concern to international law
(like drug smuggling) or tries to anticipate the development of international
law norms, and attaches universal jurisdiction to offenses where the relevant treaties or state practice has not done so. Each statute must be analyzed individually to determine whether the conduct is universally
cognizable in international law, as well as the existence of other potential
bases of congressional power.281
Some statutes seem to have gone too far. The biggest (and only) font
of universal jurisdiction prosecutions is the MDLEA. Yet drug trafficking
is not generally understood to be a universal jurisdiction offense.282 The
new Narco-Terrorism Act extends American drug law to conduct with no
U.S. nexus. Drug distribution is not an international crime at all, let alone a
universally cognizable one.283 Furthermore, neither the relevant internaentirely and immediately. See WHEATON, supra note 97, §§ 125–26, at 165–69; see also The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, app. at 27 (1825) (describing European measures against the slave trade).
281
See Kontorovich, supra note †.
282
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (not including drug trafficking in list of offenses recognized internationally as of universal concern); PRINCETON PRINCIPLES OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 48 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) (explaining that drug crimes “were raised as
candidates for inclusion” in the list of serious crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, but were not ultimately selected).
283
At least some observers have expressed doubts about Congress’s Article I power to exercise
universal jurisdiction over narco-terrorism. See BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., USA PATRIOT IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 28
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tional conventions nor state practice suggest that universal jurisdiction exists over the use of child soldiers.284 Finally, the Alien Tort Statute has been
used as a basis of civil universal jurisdiction over a variety of wrongs with
no connection to the United States. This Article shows Congress’s Article I
authority under the Define and Punish Clause requires that the conduct it
punishes either have some connection to the United States, or else be piracy
or some other offense clearly treated as universally cognizable through the
general consent of nations—if one accepts that clause’s meaning tracks
changes in international law. Because the requirement that the conduct be
universally cognizable under international law is a constitutional limitation
in ATS cases, it suggests that courts should be surer of conduct’s universal
jurisdiction status than perhaps would be necessary if the limitation was
statutory or prudential.

n.110 (2006) (“In cases where neither the support, the drug offense, nor the terrorism have any connection to the U.S. other than the later presences of the offender here, paragraph 960A(b)(5) may exceed
Congress’s legislative reach unless the benefit of a treaty obligation can be claimed.”).
284
See Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2442(c)(3) (West 2008).
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